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IN DEFENSE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:  
A PRAGMATIC LOOK AT THE DOCTRINE AS A TOOL FOR 
STRENGTHENING TRIBAL COURTS 
RYAN SEELAU*  
ABSTRACT 
 
Although the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity was recently 
upheld by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,1 
its existence continues to be attacked as “antiquated” and leading to 
“unfair” results.  While most defenses of tribal sovereign immunity focus 
on how the doctrine is a necessary part of sovereignty or how the doctrine is 
necessary for financial reasons, the more pragmatic benefits of tribal 
sovereign immunity have remained largely overlooked.  Any desire to take 
tribal self-determination seriously and to allow Native nations to produce 
their own robust and capable governing systems means re-examining the 
role tribal sovereign immunity plays in such efforts. 
This article conducts such a re-examination.  First, it takes note of the 
extensive research indicating that strong tribal courts are generally 
necessary for healthy and resilient Native nations.  Second, it looks at the 
six components that comprise strong tribal courts:  (1) accountability; (2) 
capacity; (3) funding; (4) independence; (5) jurisdiction; and (6) legitimacy.  
Finally, it argues that the strategic use of tribal sovereign immunity has 
positive effects on all six components of strong tribal court systems.  In 
essence, tribal sovereign immunity is a valuable tool that Native nations can 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a revolution currently taking place in Native American 
communities throughout the United States.  After more than 200 years of 
policies designed to destroy and/or assimilate Native American culture, 
many Native nations have started taking control of their own destinies by 
exercising true self-determination over the decisions that affect their 
everyday lives.2  The result has been stronger and healthier communities. 
Tribal courts and tribal justice systems play a key role in meaningful 
exercises of Native American self-determination.3  A strong tribal court 
system is critical to Native nation building4 because “it advances 
sovereignty, helps uphold the nation’s constitution, helps ensure the 
maintenance of law and order, bolsters economic development, promotes 
peace and resolves conflicts within the community, preserves tribal 
customs, and develops and implements new laws and practices for 
 
2.  Miriam Jorgensen, Editor’s Introduction to REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS:  STRATEGIES 
FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT xi, xii  (Miriam Jorgensen, ed., 2007). 
3.  Raymond L. Niblock & William C. Plouffe, Federal Courts, Tribal Courts, and Comity:  
Developing Tribal Judiciaries and Forum Selection, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 219, 227 
(1997) (“To be able to adjudicate a claim involving applicable law is an essential element of 
sovereignty, self-government, and self-determination.  Thus a critical part of promoting tribal self-
government is advancing a tribal judiciary.”). 
4.  See Stephen Brimley et al., Strengthening and Rebuilding Tribal Justice Systems:  
Learning from History and Looking Towards the Future, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE iii 
(2005), www ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/210893.pdf (“‘Nation building’ refers to the process, 
undertaken by indigenous nations themselves, of constructing effective institutions of self-
government that can provide a foundation for sustainable development, community health, and 
successful political action.  In other words, it is the process of promoting Indian nations’ self-
determination, self-governance, and sovereignty—and, ultimately, of improving tribal citizens’ 
social and economic situations—through the creation of more capable, culturally legitimate 
institutions of governance.”). 
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addressing contemporary realities.”5  But what makes a tribal court system 
a strong tribal court system—what are the components of a strong tribal 
court system?  And how can Native nations strengthen their own court 
systems? 
In this article, I argue that strong tribal court systems are composed of 
at least six components:  accountability, capacity, funding, independence, 
jurisdiction, and legitimacy.6  The extent to which these six components are 
present or absent in a tribal court system has a large role in determining 
whether, and to what degree, the court system is effective at carrying out its 
goals.  Furthermore, I argue that the often-maligned7 doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity—and the ability of Native nations to determine how 
and when to waive it—are critical in reinforcing the six aforementioned 
components and, ultimately, in producing a strong tribal court system.8 
To make these arguments, this article is divided into seven parts:  Part 
II examines the critical role tribal courts play in Native self-determination.  
It does this by first looking at the so-called “nation building research,” 
which explains how effective governing institutions are critical to any 
Native self-determination efforts.  Second, Part II explains the role courts 
play in any society and why their functions are particularly important in the 
context of Native nation building.  Part III digs deeper into the 
characteristics of a strong tribal court system and discusses six key 
components—accountability, capacity, funding, independence, jurisdiction, 
and legitimacy—drawn from the available literature on the topic.  Part IV 
introduces the legal doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and looks briefly 
 
5.  Joseph Thomas Flies-Away, Carrie Garrow, & Miriam Jorgensen, Native Nation Courts:  
Key Players in Nation Rebuilding, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS:  STRATEGIES FOR 
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 115, 117 (Miriam Jorgensen, ed. 2007). 
6.  Listed alphabetically, not in order of importance. 
7.  See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 766 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is an unjust rule, and “[t]his is 
especially so with respect to tort victims who have no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of 
sovereign immunity; yet nothing in the Court’s reasoning limits the rule to lawsuits arising out of 
voluntary contractual relationships.  Governments, like individuals, should pay their debts and 
should be held accountable for their unlawful, injurious conduct.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Against 
Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001). 
8.  The central argument of this article is as an elaboration on the one put forth by another 
commentator, Catherine Struve.  In her piece, Struve argues that “tribes should use their immunity 
as a forum-allocation device” and that “waiv[ing] immunity in tribal courts but not elsewhere can 
simultaneously provide redress for valid claims and strengthen tribal court systems.”  Catherine T. 
Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 137 (2004).  However, the body 
of Struve’s piece is less concerned with how sovereign immunity waivers strengthen courts, and is 
more concerned with establishing that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is justified within 
the parameters of the U.S. political and legal systems.  This article attempts to pick up where 
Struve ended by exploring how the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity—and more importantly, 
the practice of waiving it—actually strengthens tribal court systems.  In that sense, this article is 
neither a repetition nor a contraction of Struve’s work, but is instead a complimentary piece to it. 
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at the justifications for its existence.  Part V explains how the doctrine of 
tribal sovereign immunity can be used to strengthen—or weaken—tribal 
court systems.  Part VI provides real-life examples of how Native nations 
with strong court systems are using the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity to their benefit.  Additionally, Part VI retells the stories of three 
award-winning tribal court systems—the Mississippi Choctaw Band of 
Indians’ Tribal Court System, the Northwest Intertribal Court System (with 
a focus on the Tulalip Tribe’s actions within that system), and the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians’ Tribal Court.  Each case 
study demonstrates a slightly different strategy with respect to the tribal 
sovereign immunity doctrine, and together they offer examples other Native 
nations can draw from.  Finally, Part VII provides a brief conclusion. 
II. NATION BUILDING AND TRIBAL COURTS 
A. THE NATION BUILDING PRINCIPLES9 
Indigenous self-determination is alive and well in United States Native 
communities.  After centuries of government policies designed to destroy 
and/or assimilate Native American culture, many Native nations have re-
taken control of their own destinies by exercising true self-determination 
over the decisions that affect their everyday lives.10  The result has been 
stronger and healthier communities.  But what “explain[s] the fact  
that—despite decades of crippling poverty and powerlessness—some 
American Indian nations recently [have] been strikingly successful at 
achieving their own economic, political, social and cultural goals, while 
others [are] having repeated difficulty accomplishing the same things?”11 
The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development 
(“Harvard Project”) and the Native Nations Institute for Leadership, 
Management, and Policy (“NNI”) have been examining these types of 
questions for more than twenty-five years.12  The results of their extensive 
research indicate that five principles are crucial for successful community 
development in Indian Country:  (1) Native nations must make their own 
decisions by exercising practical sovereignty, or self-rule; (2) Native 
nations need to back-up their decisions with effective governing institutions; 
 
9.  Although modified, portions of Part II A and B of this paper originally appeared in the 
Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law.  See Ryan Seelau, The Kids Aren’t Alright:  An Argument to 
Use the Nation Building Model in the Development of Native Juvenile Justice Systems to Combat 
the Effects of Failed Assimilative Policies, 17 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 97, 118-20, 124-28 (2012). 
10.  Jorgensen, supra note 2, at xii. 
11.  Id.  at xi. 
12.  Id. 
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(3) these governing institutions must match their own political cultures, that 
is, they must exhibit cultural match;13 (4) Native nations need a strategic 
orientation when making their decisions; and (5) Native leadership is 
necessary to mobilize the community and promote community 
development.14  Taken together, these five nation building principles 
indicate that community development and economic development are, 
above all else, governance problems and must be addressed as such.15 
In its most basic formulation, the nation building principles refer to 
“the processes by which a Native nation enhances its own foundational 
capacity for effective self-governance and for self-determined community 
and economic development.”16  The better a community adheres to the five 
nation building principles, the greater chance that community has of 
successfully achieving its cultural, economic, political and social goals.17  
Practically speaking, the nation building principles take on many forms 
within Indian Country.18  The nation building principles do not offer a one-
size-fits-all formula that can be replicated in every community, but rather 
present those factors that are critical for a community to successfully 
address its own unique problems with its own unique solutions. 
B. EFFECTIVE GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS 
One of the nation building principles stemming from the Harvard 
Project and NNI research states that self-determination and self-governance 
 
13.  See Brimley et al., supra note 4, at 14 (“Using a rigorous research methodology and 
carefully chosen tribal comparisons, Cornell and Kalt show that certain tribes with identical 
constitutional-level governing institutions have experienced radically different socioeconomic 
outcomes, while other tribes with quite different institutions have realized comparable levels of 
success.  Other things equal, the variable that explains these divergent outcomes is ‘cultural 
match’:  if a nation’s institutional rules and processes are culturally legitimate (that is, if they 
match underlying expectations of the way authority and power should be distributed and 
exercised), they underwrite socioeconomic progress; if not, progress is difficult.”). 
14.  Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to the Development of Native 
Nations:  One Works, the Other Doesn’t, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS:  STRATEGIES FOR 
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 18 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007). 
15.  See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where’s the Glue?:  Institutional Bases of 
American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. SOCIO-ECON. 443, 447 (2000) (“Economic 
development is a social problem.  Among other things, it requires that people organize themselves 
in ways that take advantage of the fact that specialization by individuals in their production 
activities is critically important to the advancement of their well-being.”); see also Miriam 
Jorgensen & Jonathan Taylor, What Determines Indian Economic Success?:  Evidence from 
Tribal and Individual Indian Enterprises, NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE 6 (2000), 
http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/PRS00-3.pdf (“Essentially the research of the 
Harvard Project finds that poverty in Indian Country is a political problem—not an economic 
one.”).  For a more complete presentation of the Nation Building Model and its key components, 
see Seelau, supra note 9, at 118-33. 
16.  Jorgenson, supra note 2, at xii. 
17.  Cornell & Kalt, supra note 14, at 6. 
18.  Id. 
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are more likely to succeed when effective governing institutions capable of 
carrying out Native nation policies are in place.19  Institutions are 
responsible for implementing policy and transforming it from an idea on 
paper to something practical that affects the lives of the nation’s citizens.  
Institutions, to be useful for purposes of self-determination, must be 
effective at achieving their designed purpose.20  Effective governing 
institutions are stable and must have clear rules and policies in place to 
define their rights and responsibilities as well as their relationship to other 
aspects of government.21  Having well-defined institutional roles is 
especially important because, in order to effectively govern, an institution is 
frequently going to be part of a coordinated effort with other governing 
institutions. 
While the primary value of having effective governing institutions is 
the ability to turn policy into action, such institutions provide additional 
benefits as well.  For example, effective governing institutions can reduce a 
Native nation’s dependency on non-Native governments and the negative 
consequences that often accompany such dependency,22 can provide an 
opportunity for Native nations to demonstrate their skill in addressing 
various political and social issues, which may lead to future opportunities to 
increase practical sovereignty,23 and, if designed to be culturally relevant, 
can create and reinforce Native norms.24  When Native nations “back up 
sovereignty with stable, fair, effective, and reliable governing institutions,” 
they “increase their chances of improving community well-being.”25 
C. TRIBAL COURTS 
Although exercising effective self-determination requires a variety of 
effective governing institutions, a forum for non-politicized dispute 
 
19.  Id.  at 22. 
20.  Id.  at 24. 
21.  Id.  at 23. 
22.  Amy Besaw et al., The Context and Meaning of Family Strengthening in Indian 
Country: A Report to the Annie E. Casey Foundation, HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 20 (2004), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED485942.pdf. 
23.  For example, the Citizen Potawatomi Nation has increased its practical sovereignty by 
developing a court system that is so effective in administering justice that local non-Native 
communities willingly submit themselves to its jurisdiction.  See Bethel Trustee Removed ‘Under 
Operation of Law,’ THE TECUMSEH COUNTYWIDE NEWS AND THE SHAWNEE SUN, December 6, 
2007, http://www.countywidenews.com/articles/2007/12/06/news/03bethel%20trustee.txt. 
24.  To put it another way, effective governing institutions can be a tool in the struggle 
against assimilation and for cultural preservation.  See generally John G. Red Horse et al., Family 
Preservation:  Concepts in American Indian Communities, NATIONAL INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
ASSOCIATION (2000), www.nicwa.org/research/01.FamilyPreservation.pdf. 
25.  Cornell & Kalt, supra note 14, at 24. 
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resolution is among the most crucial.26  An independent dispute resolution 
system is necessary to ensure that the rules and policies created by the 
nation are enforced even-handedly, regardless of who is seeking to have 
them enforced.  More and more frequently for Native nations in the United 
States, an independent dispute resolution system includes some type of 
tribal court.27 
Tribal courts play a significant role in self-determination and self-
governance efforts and have responsibilities that “bear heavily on how well 
Indian tribes succeed overall.”28  These responsibilities include: advancing 
tribal sovereignty, empowering the other branches of government, 
promoting peace and community health, and supporting economic growth.29  
More generally, tribal courts “define the legal expectations on which 
people—Indian and non-Indian—and entities will rely when living, visiting, 
and doing business on the reservation.”30 
III. THE MAKINGS OF STRONG TRIBAL COURTS 
While there is widespread agreement that strong tribal court systems 
are vital to self-determination among academics, government officials, and 
practitioners alike, considerably less has been said or written about what 
distinguishes a strong tribal court from a weak one.  One of the most robust 
attempts to define the elements of a strong tribal court system comes from 
scholars Duane Champagne and Carole Goldberg.  Champagne and 
Goldberg propose a six-part framework outlining what tribal justice systems 
require to be successful.31  The six requirements they outline are: control, 
cultural competency, effective management, fairness, funding, and 
intergovernmental cooperation.32  While their book offers compelling 
support for the proposed framework, it is significant to note that the 
 
26.  Id.  at 23; Niblock & Plouffe, supra note 3, at 227 (“To be able to adjudicate a claim 
involving applicable law is an essential element of sovereignty, self-government, and self-
determination.  Thus a critical part of promoting tribal self-government is advancing a tribal 
judiciary.”). 
27.  Compare Tribal Courts and the Administration of Justice in Indian Country:  Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 576-1 (2008) (statement of Sen. Byron 
Dorgan) (“Today, there are about 290 tribal district courts and more than 150 tribal appellate 
courts.”), with Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign:  Indian Tribal Courts, 
33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997) (“As of 1992, there were about 170 tribal courts, with jurisdiction 
encompassing a total of perhaps one million Americans.”). 
28.  Douglas B. L. Enderson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts Today, 79 JUDICATURE 
143-44 (1995). 
29.  See generally Flies-Away, Garrow, & Jorgensen, supra note 5, at 115-45. 
30.  Enderson, supra note 28, 143-44. 
31.  See DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE GOLDBERG, CAPTURED JUSTICE:  NATIVE 
NATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (2012). 
32.  Id. 
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authors’ framework was written—as the book title indicates—for Native 
nations living under Public Law 280 (“P.L. 280”) jurisdiction.33  And 
within that context, the authors are particularly concerned with the 
administration of criminal justice within such jurisdictions.  While neither 
consideration radically harms the usefulness of the proposed framework, it 
does mean the framework possesses some limitations when applied outside 
the criminal justice context of P.L. 280 states.  Given the specific context of 
their work, I offer my own modification on the Champagne-Goldberg 
framework, which I assembled from a number of sources.34  Upon 
completing this research, six components of strong tribal court systems 
emerged:  accountability, capacity, funding; independence, jurisdiction, and 
legitimacy. 
A. ACCOUNTABILITY 
Strong tribal court systems are accountable for the decisions they 
produce.  Or, to put it more accurately, judges in strong tribal court systems 
are accountable for their actions.  Accountability likely means that some 
mechanism for reprimand and/or removal is in place in the event a judge 
begins to act in bad faith or conducts him or herself unethically.  For many 
Native nations, this accountability might be tied to an election of some sort 
or to a removal proceeding.  Regardless of the exact mechanism employed 
by a Native nation to ensure accountability, accountability needs to occur 
within the confines of an independent judiciary.  A judge who can be 
removed at the whim of another branch of government may be accountable 
to that branch of government in the technical sense, but the cost of that 
accountability is a lack of judicial independence, which is another 
component necessary for a strong tribal court system.35 
 
33.  For more information on P.L. 280, see, e.g., Carole E. Goldberg & Duane Champagne, 
Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 
700-01 (2006) (“Public Law 280 authorized state criminal jurisdiction over Indians and non-
Indians on reservations in six named states with significant numbers of federally recognized 
tribes:  Alaska (added in 1958 when it became a state), California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, 
and Wisconsin . . . .  The act also allowed all other states to opt for similar jurisdiction, and several 
did so . . . Public Law 280 did not eliminate or limit tribal criminal jurisdiction, although the 
Department of the Interior often used it as a justification for denying funding support to tribes in 
the affected states for law enforcement and criminal justice.”). 
34.  These sources include review of the academic legal literature, including, of course, 
Champagne and Goldberg’s CAPTURED JUSTICE, a review of the literature produced by  
non-Indian government officials, a review of the literature produced by non-Indian businesspeople 
who interact regularly with Native nations, and, most importantly, a review of the literature 
produced by employees of, and practitioners in, tribal courts. 
35.  See discussion infra Part III.D. for a more complete discussion of “independence” as a 
component of strong tribal court systems.  See also Tim Shimizu, Strengthening Sovereignty 
Through the Courts:  How Native American Tribal Courts Can Inform Native Hawaiian Nation 
Building, 17 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 56, 72-73 (2012).   
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Accountability may also be achieved, in part or in whole, through the 
use of appellate courts.36  While appellate court systems may be neither 
feasible nor desirable for all Native nations, they do offer the benefit of 
keeping lower court judges accountable for the decisions they make.37 
Ideally, an appellate judge will have more capacity—i.e. experience and 
training—than the lower court judges he or she is reviewing in order to 
ensure that the best decision possible is being reached in any given case.  In 
order to be a component of a strong tribal court system, appellate review 
needs to occur within the confines of an independent judiciary.  A tribal 
council conducting appellate review of a tribal court judge may promote 
accountability, but at the expense of independence. 
B. CAPACITY 
Strong tribal court systems require the capacity necessary to administer 
justice.  This component is comprised of both human capacity and 
institutional capacity.  A tribal court system’s capacity, in the literal sense, 
is the number of disputes it can resolve over a given period of time.  This is 
dependent on both the human and institutional limitations of a given court 
system.38  Capacity, in a more general sense, includes not just the literal 
number of disputes that a court system can handle, but also the skill and 
effectiveness with which those disputes are dealt. 
As such, human capacity includes the abilities, education-level, 
experience, and skills of all who service the tribal court system, including 
clerks, judges, lawyers, and support staff.  The need to improve human 
capacity within many tribal court systems was identified decades ago and 
continues to this day.39  Discussions of human capacity frequently revolve 
around the need, on one hand, to have educated and trained tribal court 
personnel and the need, on the other hand, to have those same personnel be 
aware of and understand the unique cultural norms and values of the 
community they are serving.40 
 
36.  Hearing, supra note 27 (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan) (“Today, there are about 290 
tribal district courts and more than 150 appellate courts.”). 
37.  Tribal Court Systems and Indian Civil Rights Act:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 338-36 (1988) (statement of Joseph Little). 
38.  Frank Pommersheim, What Must be Done to Achieve the Vision of the Twenty-First 
Century Tribal Judiciary, 7 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y  8, 12 (1997).  
39.  O’Connor, supra note 27, at 5; see also Kirke Kickingbird, Striving for the 
Independence of Native American Tribal Courts, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2009), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol36_20
09/winter2009/striving_for_the_independence_of_native_american_tribal_courts html. 
40.  Tribal Courts and the Administration of Justice in Indian Country:  Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 576-10 (2008) (statement by Roman Duran). 
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While human capacity is undoubtedly the heart and soul of any tribal 
court system, the importance of institutional capacity cannot be 
overlooked.41  Institutional capacity involves all of the non-human elements 
that make up a tribal court system—the building itself, the computer 
network, the filing system, and so forth.  For example, in the context of 
criminal justice, institutional capacity would likely extend to the availability 
of beds in juvenile centers and adult prisons.  A Native nation’s institutional 
capacity can have a surprisingly strong effect on how justice is administered 
and, in certain circumstances, may directly affect perceptions of 
legitimacy.42  As with human capacity, institutional capacity of a tribal 
court system is also tied very closely to the issue of funding. 
C. FUNDING 
Funding is without a doubt the component of strong tribal court 
systems upon which there is the greatest consensus and greatest amount 
written.43  Without delving into the history of the underfunding of tribal 
court systems or the efforts to help remedy deficiencies in funding, it 
suffices to say that funding hugely impacts the relative strength or weakness 
of a tribal court system.  The reasons for this are obvious and include the 
fact that funding has an enormous role in determining the various capacities 
of a tribal court system.  And the capacities—both human and 
institutional—of a tribal court system go a long way in determining the 
overall strength of the system. 
D. INDEPENDENCE 
Strong tribal court systems must be independent from outside 
influences. Most importantly, this means tribal court judges need to be able 
to make decisions freely and independently of influences from other 
branches of government.  To this end, tribal court judges need to be able to 
make decisions without fear of retaliation from other branches of 
government and without the possibility that other branches of government 
will improperly overturn their decisions.  Tribal court systems also need to 
be independent from other outside influences, including other courts, 
 
41.  Id.  at 5 (statement by Patrick Ragsdale) (“Although the main request from tribal courts 
is operating funding, the next two main areas that tribal courts consistently seek assistance is in 
training for tribal judges and staff, and technical assistance in developing judicial administrative 
systems.”).  See also id. at 13 (statement of Roman Duran) (“A vital note to make here is that most 
tribal justice systems lack access to law libraries, legal authorities, internet access, and law clerks 
to provide the needed research in rendering decisions.”). 
42.  See discussion infra Part III.F. for a more complete discussion of “legitimacy” as a 
component of strong tribal court systems. 
43.  See generally Kickingbird, supra note 39; Hearing, supra note 27. 
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governments, and corporations.  A non-independent tribal court system will 
likely lose legitimacy in the eyes of the nation itself and with those who do 
business with the nation.  And a reputation of non-independence can easily 
lead to devastating consequences.44  To avoid such consequences, Native 
nations may enact laws and procedures to ensure the independence of a 
tribal court system.45 
E. JURISDICTION 
Strong tribal courts—like any other type of court—require jurisdiction 
within which to operate.  The best funded, most accountable, independent, 
and legitimate court system in the world, even if staffed with the brightest 
human minds, would be of no value if it had no jurisdiction.  At first glance, 
those familiar with federal Indian law may argue that this should not be a 
component of strong tribal court systems because it is something seemingly 
outside the control of any individual Native nation.  The reality, however, is 
that while the outer boundaries of tribal jurisdiction may largely be setup by 
the contours of federal Indian law, in practice, Native nations have some 
significant control over the cases they hear. 
Native nations have some discretion over the types of cases their tribal 
judicial systems hear limited, of course, by the jurisdictional confines of 
federal Indian law.46  This control is evident when one compares a Native 
nation with no tribal court system with a Native nation that has such a 
system.  Native nations with no tribal court systems have the same de jure 
jurisdiction as nations with court systems, but their de facto jurisdiction is 
essentially non-existent because they have no way to exercise it.  To put it 
differently, because Native nations are governments, they have a significant 
amount of control over both the procedural law and substantive law 
governing cases that come before their courts.  Additionally, Native nations 
 
44.  See Jorgensen & Taylor, supra note 15, at 5 (“Thus, all else equal, tribes that implement 
a separation of powers that leaves their dispute resolution mechanisms outside political influence 
enjoy a 5 percent lower level of unemployment than tribes that do not.”). 
45.  However, it is worth saying that adequate funding of court system personnel may, in 
certain circumstance, play a limited role in deterring the likelihood that one type of  
influence—money—will have any effect on influencing court personnel. 
46.  For example, Native nations’ jurisdiction over nonmembers in civil actions is limited; 
see, e.g., Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness:  Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (2013) (“In the past few decades, the Supreme Court has undertaken a 
near-complete dismantling of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.  Following cases like 
Montana, Strate, and Hicks, tribes have virtually no authority to regulate nonmember conduct or 
hale nonmembers into tribal court—even when nonmembers have significant ties to the tribe and 
have come onto the reservation deliberately and for personal gain.”).  Similarly, Native nations 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is essentially nonexistent.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1817); 
but see Samuel E. Ennis, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-
Indians:  An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553 (2009). 
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have some ability to work around the jurisdictional confines of federal 
Indian law through consensual jurisdiction.  Although not an unlimited 
principle, tribal court systems are able to hear many types of cases that 
initially may seem to be outside the scope of tribal jurisdiction, so long as 
the party or parties involved consent to jurisdiction.47  In this respect, the 
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity—discussed later in this  
article—provides Native nations with a tool that can assist in acquiring the 
consent necessary to expand tribal jurisdiction.  Native nations have 
expanded their jurisdiction based on consent to: provide court services to 
non-Native communities,48 ensure that taxation disputes with states go 
through tribal court,49 and address a myriad of difficult criminal and social 
problems.50 
F. LEGITIMACY 
Strong tribal court systems must be legitimate in the eyes of the 
citizenry whom they serve and, secondarily, in the eyes of the non-Native 
population with which the nation interacts or has the desire to interact 
with.51  Tribal court systems “must strive to embody tribal values—values 
that at times suggest the use of different methods than those used in the 
Anglo-American, adversarial, common-law tradition.”52  If a tribal court 
does not reflect tribal values, the very people the court is designed to serve 
will see it as illegitimate.  There is now a strong body of empirical evidence 
clearly indicating that illegitimate institutions significantly harm Native 
nations’ self-determination efforts.53  On the other hand, because “law is 
 
47.  For a thorough discussion of how nonmembers consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction, 
see Paul Spruhan, “Indians, in a Jurisdictional Sense”:  Tribal Citizenship and Other Forms of 
Non-Indian Consent to Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 79 (2013). 
48.  See Seelau, supra note 9, at 127. 
49.  Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the Michigan 
Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 32 (2004). 
50.  See Seelau, supra note 9, at 130-33 (case study from the Organized Village of Kake 
demonstrating how a de facto expansion of jurisdiction can be used to combat underage drinking 
and other social ills in remote locations). 
51.  O’Connor, supra note 27, at 2. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Brimley et al., supra note 4, at 14 (“Using a rigorous research methodology and 
carefully chosen tribal comparisons, Cornell and Kalt show that certain tribes with identical 
constitutional-level governing institutions have experienced radically different socioeconomic 
outcomes, while other tribes with quite different institutions have realized comparable levels of 
success.  Other things equal, the variable that explains these divergent outcomes is “cultural 
match”:  if a nation’s institutional rules and processes are culturally legitimate (that is, if they 
match underlying expectations of the way authority and power should be distributed and 
exercised), they underwrite socioeconomic progress; if not, progress is difficult.”). 
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one of the methods by which a community constitutes its own identity,”54 a 
legitimate tribal court is able to define and promote its nation’s Native 
culture through procedures and substantive decisions.55  Specifically, a 
culturally legitimate tribal court can take laws developed by the nation and 
“interpret[] them according to culturally distinct traditions and customs,” 
and by doing so, the court helps advance the nation’s “own agenda for the 
future.”56 
In addition to being accepted as legitimate by the Native nation’s own 
citizenry, a tribal court system “must provide a forum that commands the 
respect of . . . the non-tribal community, including courts, governments, and 
litigants.”57  Tribal court systems rely on external legitimacy to encourage 
non-Indian actors—particularly those related to economic development—to 
engage with the nation58 and to discourage non-Indian actors—particularly 
state governments and the federal government—from interfering with tribal 
authority.59  With respect to encouraging non-Indian actors to engage with 
the nation, there is now ample evidence to indicate that a tribal court system 
that is seen as legitimate by external actors is “an indispensable foundation” 
to any substantial economic development efforts because it is the court that 
“helps create an atmosphere of fair play in the disputes that inevitably arise 
among those who live, work, or do business in a tribal community.”60  
Along the same lines, when a tribal court system is deemed to be 
illegitimate by external actors—particularly by state governments and/or the 
federal government—outside actors tend to make efforts to interfere with 
Native nations’ sovereignty in an effort to fix a perceived injustice.61  On 
 
54.  Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis:  One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal 
Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 293 (1998). 
55.  See, e.g., Seelau, supra note 9, at 124-29. 
56.  Flies-Away, Garrow, & Jorgensen, supra note 5, at 117 (emphasis added). 
57.  O’Connor, supra note 27, at 2. 
58.  See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 37, at 21 (statement by Joseph Flies-Away) (“Tribal 
courts are “a way to contribute to economic development, our economic possibility.  When people 
want to come to the reservation and do business and there is a fair playing field to do so, then that 
is going to be a court, a good court is going to be a place where they can come and actually feel 
good and comfortable about doing business there.”). 
59.  Newton, supra note 54, at 293. 
60.  Flies-Away, Garrow, and Jorgensen, supra note 5, at 118-19. 
61.  The Cherokee Freedman saga that ultimately resulted in federal intervention is perhaps 
the best recent example of perceived unfairness resulting in outside actors getting involved in 
Native nation government.  See, e.g., Chris Casteel, Obama administration lawsuit could finally 
decide freedmen issue, Cherokee Nation says, NEWOK, July 4, 2012, http://newsok.com/obama-
administration-lawsuit-could-finally-decide-freedmen-issue-cherokee-nation-
says/article/3689660; Julianne Jennings, Cherokee Freedmen: One Year Later, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK, Jan. 31, 2012, 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/cherokee-freedmen%3A-one-year-later-
78777; Nathan Koppel, Tribe Fights with Slaves’ Kin, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303292204577519000907248734.html.  
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the other hand, when a Native nation’s court system is seen as legitimate by 
external actors, not only do non-Native governments tend to interfere less, 
but they may, in certain circumstances, seek to partner with Native nations 
capable of administering justice in a competent, legitimate, and efficient 
fashion.62 
But what does a tribal court system need to do in order to be judged 
“legitimate” by external actors?  The answer seems to rest in the concept of 
fairness.63  Tribal court systems that are deemed “fair” will be treated as 
legitimate courts, while “unfair” courts will be called “illegitimate,” 
“dishonest,” or “kangaroo courts.”  While fairness is always going to be in 
the eye of the beholder to some degree, courts around the world have agreed 
on a set of principles that, generally speaking, separate fair courts from 
unfair ones.  One principle is that every wrong must have a remedy.64  The 
quickest way to be deemed an unfair court is to turn away individuals who 
believe they have been seriously wronged and seek redress in the judicial 
system.  Second, fair courts must have procedures in place to dispense 
justice and, more importantly, those procedures must treat all individuals 
equally.65  Third, fair courts must dispense justice consistently—meaning 
similar cases must be decided similarly.66  Fourth, fair courts require 
judicial independence, a topic discussed above.  And finally, fair court 
systems tend to be transparent systems—everyone knows the rules ahead of 
time, everyone understand how a decision is going to be made, and 
everyone has access to a decision after it has been produced.67  Perhaps 
surprisingly to some, fairness in a court context is more about notice and 
procedure than it is about substantive outcomes—telling people how the 
process will work and then making sure it works as advertised will go a 
long ways in getting a court labeled “fair.” 
While identifying the components of a strong tribal court system is 
important, the real challenge is determining how a Native nation’s court 
system can improve in each of these six areas.  Although many paths are 
available to Native nations seeking to strengthen tribal court systems, the 
remainder of this article argues that the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
 
62.  See Bethel Trustee Removed, supra note 23. 
63.  O’Connor, supra note 27, at 2. 
64.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
65.  See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
66.  See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997); contra Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating 
Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1974). 
67.  See generally Álvaro Herrero & Gaspar López, Access to Information and Transparency 
in the Judiciary:  A Guide to Good Practices from Latin America, WORLD BANK (2010), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/213798-1259011531325/6598384-
1268250334206/Transparency_Judiciary.pdf.  
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immunity is a critical tool all Native nations have.  When used strategically, 
tribal sovereign immunity can help build strong tribal court systems by 
strengthening the six components discussed above. 
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Sovereign immunity, in its simplest formulation, is the right of the 
sovereign to be free from being sued in court except when it consents to the 
lawsuit.68  A more functional definition of sovereign immunity is a 
government’s power “to define the forum, procedure, and limits respecting 
[law]suits against itself.”69  The doctrine of sovereign immunity has its 
origins in British common law and was considered settled law as early as 
the late thirteenth century.70  It has been a part of United States 
jurisprudence from the time of the country’s founding.71  Typically, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity is said to have derived from the notion that 
“the King can do no wrong,”72 a precept that, historically, was not shared 
by any of the Native nations living in the Americas.73 
Today, federally recognized tribes enjoy the privilege of sovereign 
immunity.  The first Supreme Court case to mention tribal sovereign 
immunity was Turner v. United States.74  Although the case did not 
primarily concern the issue of tribal sovereign immunity, the Court still 
recognized its application to tribes by noting that “[w]ithout authorization 
from Congress, the [tribe] could not have been sued in any court; at least 
without its consent.”75  It was more than twenty years later when the Court 
solidified the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity in the case of United 
 
68.  Cohens v Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 380 (1821) (“The counsel for the defendant in error . . . 
have laid down the general proposition that a sovereign independent State is not suable except by 
its own consent.  This general proposition will not be controverted.”). 
69.  NNI Forum:  Tribal Sovereign Immunity, NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE (May 14, 2007), 
https://nnidatabase.org/video/nni-forum-tribal-sovereign-immunity. 
70.  Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:  Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1963).  
71.  See generally Cohens v Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of 
an individual without its consent.”). 
72.  Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1202. 
73.  See NNI Forum, supra note 69 (“And so Europeans brought to this country this notion of 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which . . . has no parallel anywhere in Indian country.  I have 
not studied a North American Indian tribe [that] adopted the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity 
prior to 1492.  In fact, in the famous words of Chief Sitting Bull when he was told about the 
doctrine [in which the doctrine] was translated to mean ‘the Chief can do no wrong,’ he replied, 
‘and expect to get away with it.’  In Indian country, the idea that our leaders aren’t accountable 
just doesn’t fly.”). 
74.  248 U.S. 354 (1919). 
75.  Id.  at 358. 
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States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.76  In U.S. Fidelity, the 
Court held that “Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional 
authorization,” citing the Turner case as support.77  Over the decades, the 
doctrine has been refined, but the basic principle has remained unchanged: 
“federally recognized Indian tribes are immune from suit by any entity or 
individual, other than the United States, absent their consent or 
congressional abrogation.”78 
Although tribal sovereign immunity is widely understood as an 
inherent part of tribal sovereignty,79 the legal doctrine rests on shaky 
ground.  As an inherent part of tribal sovereignty, sovereign immunity 
should be understood not as a delegation of congressional power, but as a 
privilege each Native nation possessed prior to the creation of the United 
States by virtue of its status as a sovereign nation.  In reality, however, 
tribal sovereign immunity—like all other areas of federal Indian law—is 
subject to the will of Congress80 and, at least in the eyes of some, to the will 
of the Supreme Court.81  It has long been held that Congress has plenary 
powers over Indian affairs, including power over tribal sovereign immunity.  
Thus, at any point in time, Congress could choose to limit or eliminate the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity in the tribal context altogether. 
 
76.  309 U.S. 506 (1940). 
77.  Id. at 512 n.11. 
78.  Clay R. Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity:  A Primer, 50 THE ADVOC. 19, 19 (2007), 
www.isb.idaho.gov/pdf/advocate/issues/advo7may.pdf. 
79.  See, e.g., Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“the nature of tribal 
sovereign immunity . . . is not the product of any enactment but an inherent attribute of a tribe’s 
sovereignty.  Tribal sovereign immunity existed at the Founding, as surely did tribal 
sovereignty . . . .”).  See also Mary-Beth Moylan, Sovereign Rules of the Game: Requiring 
Campaign Finance Disclosure in the Face of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 
5 (2010) (“Tribal sovereignty, including immunity to suit, is rooted in a tribe’s historical existence 
preceding the formation of the United States.”); Erick J. Rohan, What Congress Gives, Congress 
Takes Away:  Tribal Sovereign Immunity and the Threat of Agroterrorism, 19 SAN JOAQUIN 
AGRIC. L. REV. 137, 138 (2010) (“Indian tribes were recognized as sovereigns prior to the 
existence of the United States which entitles them to some immunity from suit”); Andrea M. 
Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law:  
Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian 
Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 683 (2002) (“[T]he doctrine [of tribal sovereign immunity] 
has long been recognized by all three branches of the federal government as an essential and 
inherent element of tribal sovereignty.”). But see Smith, supra note 78, at 20 (“[Tribal sovereign] 
immunity is judge-made, or federal common law, in character.  It does not derive from the United 
States Constitution and is subject not only to congressional control but also to federal 
constitutional restrictions.”). 
80.  See generally Aaron F.W. Meek, Comment, The Conflict Between State Tests of Tribal 
Entity Immunity and the Congressional Policy of Indian Self-Determination, 35 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 141, 147-54 (2011). 
81.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Michigan v. Bay Mills Cmty., 133 U.S. 907 
(2013) (No. 12-515). 
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In its current form, tribal sovereign immunity has boundaries.82  First, 
Native nations may not invoke sovereign immunity to avoid being sued by 
the federal government.83  Additionally, the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity does not protect individual tribal members from suit,84 although 
Native nation-owned businesses may be able to exercise the power of 
sovereign immunity.85  Similar to state sovereign immunity protected by the 
Eleventh Amendment, tribal sovereign immunity is also limited by the fact 
that tribal officers may be sued for injunctive relief in appropriate 
circumstances.86  Generally speaking though, tribal sovereign immunity’s 
boundaries are located where tribes have given consent to being sued and to 
where Congress has abrogated the applicability of the doctrine itself.87 
Native nations can consent to being sued, thus waiving tribal sovereign 
immunity.  This most commonly occurs when a Native nation expressly 
 
82.  Although a complete discussion of the boundaries of tribal sovereign immunity is 
beyond the scope of this paper.   See generally Smith, supra note 78, at 20 (“[Sovereign] 
immunity applies to suit in federal or state court brought by any party other than the United States, 
federal agency or a federal official.  The immunity applies without regard to relief sought.  The 
immunity applies without regard to nature of the controversy itself.  It therefore applies equally to 
tort, contract and enforcement claims.  The immunity applies without regard to where the dispute 
arises . . . .  The immunity applies without regard to whether the involved tribal activity is subject 
to regulation under valid federal or state law.  It is concerned with remedy, not with underlying 
liability.  The immunity may be waived by the affected tribe or abrogated by Congress.  Any 
waiver or abrogation must be unequivocal.  Immunity ordinarily does not preclude prospective 
relief against tribal officers or employees when their actions are alleged to violate federal law.  
Immunity does not extend to actions taken by tribal members in their individual capacities.”). 
83.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“Indian tribes do not, however, enjoy sovereign immunity from suits brought by the federal 
government.”); see also Padraic I. McCoy, Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Commercial Activity:  
A Legal Summary and Policy Check, 57 FED. LAW. 41, 44 (2010) (“The doctrine does not shield 
tribes from suits brought by the United States.”). 
84.  Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1977) (“Second, whether 
or not the Tribe itself may be sued in a state court without its consent or that of Congress, a suit to 
enjoin violations of state law by individual tribal members is permissible.  The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity which was applied in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 
309 U. S. 506, does not immunize the individual members of the Tribe.”). 
85.  Jeff M. Kosseff, Note, Sovereignty for Profits: Courts’ Expansion of Sovereign 
Immunity to Tribe Owned Businesses, 5 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 131, 138 (2009) (“[D]ecisions 
from lower courts after Kiowa have extended tribal sovereignty even further:  to shield for-profit 
businesses that are owned by tribes and do not perform a governmental function.”).  Although 
Native nation-owned businesses may enjoy the privilege of exercising sovereign immunity, there 
are currently a variety of tests being used by courts to determine whether tribal sovereign 
immunity applies in a specific situation or not.); Meek, supra note 80, at 156-90. 
86.  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978) (“As an officer of the Pueblo, 
petitioner Lucario Padilla is not protected by the tribe’s immunity from suit.”); see also Vann v. 
Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Applying the principle of Ex parte Young in 
the matter before us, we think it clear that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar the suit against 
tribal officers.”); McCoy, supra note 83, at 44; Smith, supra note 78, at 19. 
87.  Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).  For an analysis of 
Congress’ decisions to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in specific contexts, see Seielstad, 
supra note 79, at 717-29. 
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waives its right to sovereign immunity via clear language in a legal 
document or via the decision not to exercise the right at trial.  A Native 
nation may also impliedly waive its right to sovereign immunity in 
circumstances where the nation’s actions and/or words are interpreted by a 
court as consenting to a lawsuit, regardless of whether that was the nation’s 
actual intent or not.  For example, in C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen 
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, the Native nation had a construction 
contract with a business.88  The contract expressly stated that any disputes 
would be resolved via arbitration, but made no mention of lawsuits in court.  
A unanimous Supreme Court held that this type of clause was sufficient for 
a Native nation to be subjected to lawsuits with respect to the arbitration 
reward.89  On the other hand, in 1991, the Supreme Court, in Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, held that the mere 
filing of an action for injunctive relief by the Native nation did not result in 
a waiver of sovereign immunity and did not open up the nation to 
counterclaims alleging money-damages.90 
In addition to consent, Native nations may also be precluded from 
relying on the doctrine of sovereign immunity when Congress has 
abrogated that privilege.  Congressional legislation abrogates tribal 
sovereign immunity and subjects Native nations to lawsuits only when an 
“unequivocal expression” of congressional intent to do so exists.91  Absent 
such an expression, tribal sovereign immunity remains intact. 
Given that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on a  
precept—“the King can do no wrong”—that is generally rejected by 
democratic principles and given that the doctrine seems to run contrary to 
notions of traditional Native leadership by consensus, why then does the 
doctrine continue to exist?  While commentators have put various 
justifications of sovereign immunity forth,92 the two strongest invoke 
sovereignty and fiscal considerations.  Additionally, the role tradition plays 
in United States jurisprudence also helps explain why, despite its detractors, 
sovereign immunity remains a part of the American legal landscape. 
Sovereign immunity is often justified on the basis that it is a natural 
extension of a sovereign’s autonomous status.93  To be sovereign is to be 
 
88.  532 U.S. 411 (2001). 
89.  Smith, supra note 78, at 19. 
90.  498 U.S. 505, 516 (1991). 
91.  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). 
92.  See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1216 (“Six primary rationales [for sovereign 
immunity] are discussed below:  the importance of protecting government treasuries; separation of 
powers; the absence of authority for suits against the government; the existence of adequate 
alternative remedies; a curb on bureaucratic powers; and tradition.”). 
93.  McCoy, supra note 83, at 43. 
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the source of political power from which all specific political powers are 
derived.94  Thus, sovereignty includes the power to define the forum, 
procedure, and limits with respect to lawsuits against the sovereign—which 
is, in essence, how the doctrine of sovereign immunity functions.  As 
sovereigns, the federal government, 95 the states,96 and Native nations all 
enjoy the benefits of sovereign immunity.97  When outside actors 
acknowledge and respect a government’s exercise of sovereign immunity, 
they are implicitly recognizing that government’s sovereignty.  In this 
sense, it has been argued that this justification for sovereign immunity is 
more “likely to ring true with respect to tribal than nontribal 
governments.”98 
Sovereign immunity is also frequently justified on the grounds that “the 
doctrine prevents burdensome financial losses that could seriously impair or 
destroy governmental operations.”99  There is no question that sovereign 
immunity protects governmental treasuries by preventing lawsuits for 
money damages.100  This justification for the doctrine tends to be 
particularly significant within the tribal context.  After all, although great 
strides with respect to governmental operating budgets have been made by 
many Native nations, when compared to the states and the federal 
government, Native nations continue to have significantly less capital and 
less ability to raise capital through taxation.101  To quote one tribal court 
judge, “[i]t is not long ago that the only thing standing between the nation 
and bankruptcy was sovereign immunity.”102 
Finally, tradition also helps explain why sovereign immunity continues 
to exist within the United States legal context.  As discussed above, 
sovereign immunity has been a part of the United States’ legal fabric since 
 
94.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1430 (8th ed. 2004). 
95.  See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).  
96.  See generally John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:  
A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1890 (1983). 
97.  Smith, supra note 78, at 19. 
98.  See Struve, supra note 8, at 166-67. 
99.  Tribal Sovereign Immunity:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th 
Cong. 104 (1996) (statement of Sen. Daniel Inouye). 
100.  Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1216-17. 
101.  Tribal Sovereign Immunity:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th 
Cong., 105-595 (1998) (statement of Wayne Taylor, Jr.) (“What is overlooked by those who hold 
up Federal and State waivers of immunity in contrast to tribal waivers of immunity is the fact that 
Federal and State governments with their huge tax bases are in a much better position to grant 
broad waivers of immunity than are the Tribes which have historically been hamstrung by the lack 
of a tribal tax base, partly as a result of the dual taxation problem engendered by state taxation of 
transactions within Indian country, and partly as a result of struggling tribal economies which are 
only now beginning to see the light of day.”). 
102.  Newton, supra note 54, at 338 (quoting Kingsley v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 23 Indian L. 
Rep. 6113, 6117 n.3 (Ho-Chunk Tribal Ct. 1996)). 
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the country’s founding.103  Even within the Native context, the Supreme 
Court has explicitly recognized the doctrine for nearly a century.104  Due in 
part to the United States’ common law tradition and legal principles like 
stare decisis, legal changes tend to occur very slowly.  Undoing centuries of 
legal precedent—whether in the federal, state, or tribal context—would 
undoubtedly bring with it significant and varied impacts, the likes of which 
have probably aided in preventing the Supreme Court from abolishing the 
doctrine in any context.105 
V. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY’S IMPACT ON  
TRIBAL COURTS 
As legal scholars and courts continue to weigh the pros and cons of 
tribal sovereign immunity, the fact remains that Native nations currently 
enjoy the privilege of immunity and must decide how to use this power.  
Like any power, sovereign immunity is a tool that can be used to achieve 
different ends.  And no matter how this tool is utilized, it frequently has 
consequences for tribal courts.  This section examines the options Native 
nations have available to them as well as the pros and cons of different 
strategies with respect to tribal sovereign immunity policies. 
A. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS A TOOL THAT AFFECTS  
 TRIBAL COURTS 
Every time tribal sovereign immunity is invoked or waived, it affects 
tribal courts.  When a Native nation invokes sovereign immunity and 
prevents a lawsuit from moving forward, the effect on the tribal court 
system is, in the immediate sense, one less case on the docket.  In the long-
term, if a Native nation continually invokes sovereign immunity with 
respect to a certain type of cases (for example, all contract cases), then the 
tribal court will fail to develop any expertise or jurisprudence in that area of 
law.  Conversely, when a Native nation waives sovereign immunity and 
allows a case to be heard by the tribal court, the short-term effect is adding 
one case to the docket, and the potential long-term effect is the development 
 
103.  See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208 (1882) (“And while the exemption of the 
United States and of the several states from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in 
the courts has since that time been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never been discussed 
or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine.”). 
104.  Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919). 
105.  For a discussion of possible consequences associated with eliminating the doctrine of 
tribal sovereign immunity, see Ryan Seelau & Ian Record, How Tribes Can Prepare for Tribal 
Sovereignty Blow From Supreme Court, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (November 
8, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/11/08/sovereign-immunity-and-bay-
mills-case-how-tribes-can-prepare. 
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of expertise and jurisprudence with respect to the substantive area of law 
the case concerns.  These relatively straightforward strategic considerations, 
when paired with innovation and time, can achieve dramatically different 
results.  By way of demonstrating how tribal sovereign immunity can shape 
a tribal court system over time, consider two extreme situations:  a Native 
nation that never waives sovereign immunity and a Native nation that 
always waives sovereign immunity. 
In a Native nation that never waives sovereign immunity under any 
circumstances, no lawsuits against the nation itself would ever be heard by 
the tribal court unless authorized by Congress.106  This would likely include 
lawsuits related to civil rights violations, contract disputes arising out of 
Native nation-owned business, and torts arising out of injuries sustained on 
nation-owned lands.  Additionally, no lawsuits initiated by any of the states 
against the Native nation would be heard in any forum either.  Potentially, a 
strategy of never waiving immunity could have the positive benefit of 
providing maximum protection to the nation’s treasury.  However, the same 
strategy would likely also have other long-term costs.  One potential cost to 
the Native nation might be a tribal court system that is seen as 
underutilized, unsophisticated with respect to certain critical areas of law, 
unable to create a culturally appropriate jurisprudence in certain critical 
areas of law, and possibly illegitimate, especially to the outside world.107  
Such a court system would likely find it increasingly difficult to carry out 
its purposes—advancing tribal sovereignty, empowering the other branches 
of government, promoting peace and community health, and supporting 
economic growth over time.  Additionally, a Native nation government 
always invoking tribal sovereign immunity is likely to be seen as 
increasingly unfair—at least to those having to deal directly with the 
nation—a situation that one would expect to produce negative economic 
and relational consequences as well.108 
 
106.  Smith, supra note 78, at 19. 
107.  Non-Natives are often quick to label a Native court system “illegitimate” based on its 
use of tribal sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Kosseff, supra note 85, at 145; Seielstad, supra note 
79, at 729-35. 
108.  For example, one could imagine what such a policy would do in the context of Native 
nations’ businesses.  While the exercise of sovereign immunity by Native-nation owned 
businesses tends to garner media backlash regardless of the specifics of the situation, the use of 
tribal sovereign immunity in certain situations draws especially harsh attention from the media. 
Among the businesses that have received extra interest from the media and commentators are 
casinos, payday loan companies, and insurance companies.  See Bree R. Black Horse, The Risks 
and Benefits of Tribal Payday Lending to Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 1 AM. INDIAN L. J. 388, 
411-12 (2013) (“Moreover, tribes should not conduct payday lending over an extended period of 
time, and if a tribe elects to engage in this business, the tribe should attempt to fly under the radar 
of the press, federal officials, and the courts . . .  Otherwise, a misinformed tribal nation may 
abrogate the right to sovereign immunity for all of Indian Country.”). 
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On the opposite end of the spectrum, a Native nation that always 
waives sovereign immunity could potentially have a very active court, but 
one that would also carry both positive and negative consequences along 
with it.  For the sake of argument, I will assume that the Native nation in 
question is choosing to waive every lawsuit filed against it into tribal court 
without any limitations on damages.109  Potentially, this strategy would 
result in some negative effects on the tribal court.  On the positive side, a 
tribal court operating under these circumstances would have the opportunity 
to develop expertise and culturally-appropriate jurisprudence in a wide 
range of substantive fields of law.  This court, depending on the decisions it 
makes, may also be able to produce a track record of fairness, thus 
potentially increasing its legitimacy with all who interact with it.  On the 
negative side, a tribal court functioning under a strategy of always waiving 
tribal immunity would run the risk of being overburdened, and if that were 
to occur, then the effectiveness of the institution would decrease as delays 
in justice would likely increase.  Additionally, a strategy that allowed all 
lawsuits to move forward with no limitations on damages would put the 
nation’s treasury at risk and one lawsuit could, at least theoretically, cause 
significant financial harm to the nation.  That risk could possibly be 
counteracted somewhat by the likelihood that economic development 
originating from outside the reservation is more likely where sovereign 
immunity waivers are possible. 
In the end, neither of the extreme scenarios just discussed create an 
idea situation for a Native nation.  But these examples begin to illustrate 
how sovereign immunity policies result in different outcomes.  To put it 
more succinctly:  tribal sovereign immunity is a tool that can be used by 
Native nations to achieve a wide variety of outcomes. 
 
Gabe Galanda, Tribes and Insurance Defense Lawyers Should Avoid Asserting Sovereign 
Immunity, NORTHWEST INDIAN LAW & BUSINESS ADVISOR, July 6, 2009, 
http://www nwindianbusinesslawblog.com/2009/07/articles/oklahoma-indian-law/tribes-
insurance-defense-lawyers-should-avoid-asserting-sovereign-immunity/; Kosseff, supra note 85; 
David Lazarus, Tribes’ payday loans under scrutiny, LOS ANGELES TIMES, April 29, 2013, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/29/business/la-fi-lazarus-20130430. 
109.  This would not necessarily have to be the case.  As discussed supra, sovereign 
immunity is essentially the right of a sovereign to define the forum, procedure, and limits of a 
lawsuit.  As such, a Native nation could waive sovereign immunity and allow a case to proceed in 
a state or federal court instead of its own.  Likewise, a Native nation could waive sovereign 
immunity and allow a case to proceed in its own court, but in doing so, cap damages.  Finally, a 
Native nation could waive sovereign immunity and allow a case to go to arbitration or mediation 
instead of going to a trial setting.  The permutations and variations available to a Native nation 
waiving sovereign immunity are substantial and each carries with it different consequences. 
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B. THINKING STRATEGICALLY ABOUT TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
That tribal sovereign immunity is a tool affecting tribal courts is 
significant because, as discussed above, strong tribal courts are one of the 
foundational institutions that that vast majority of Native nations exercising 
real self-determination have in place.  Thus, Native nations serious about 
self-determination are likely going to want to contemplate how best to use 
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity to best achieve their nation’s 
goals.  To this end, the nation building principles offer some additional 
insight.  First, to use the language of the nation building principles, 
although tribal sovereign immunity is not the same as tribal sovereignty, it 
is an instrument of sovereignty—that is, of practical self-rule—that Native 
nations can use to further their goals.  Therefore, Native nations wishing to 
exercise practical self-rule are going to have to make difficult decisions 
about when to waive sovereign immunity and when to invoke it.  When 
waiving immunity, Native nations need to ensure they have effective 
governing institutions—i.e., an effective court system—prepared to 
adjudicate the cases that may arise.  Finally, the nation building principles 
suggest that a nation should approach tribal sovereign immunity with a 
strategic orientation, which includes considering the nation’s values and 
long-term goals. 
Approaching tribal sovereign immunity strategically is critical to 
understanding how the doctrine can help strengthen tribal court systems.  
Within the nation building research, strategic orientation means moving 
away from a reactive governance to one focused on “developing sustainable 
solutions to problems.”110  A strategic approach to any issue involves 
transitioning “from reactive thinking to proactive thinking,” “from short-
term thinking to long-term thinking,” “from opportunistic thinking toward 
systemic thinking,” and “from a narrow problem focus to a broader societal 
focus.”111  With respect to tribal sovereign immunity, shifting from reactive 
and short-term thinking to proactive and long-term thinking with respect to 
tribal sovereign immunity likely means shifting from the question “Can 
sovereign immunity be raised in this case” to “What policy should the 
nation have in place with respect to raising sovereign immunity in a case.”  
Shifting from opportunistic thinking toward systemic thinking likely means 
determining what the nation’s long-term goals are and how both waiving 
 
110.  Stephen Cornell et al., Seizing the Future:  Why Some Native Nations Do and Others 
Don’t, NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE 1, 5 (2005), 
https://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/JOPNAs/2005_CORNELL_orgensen_etal_JOPNA_se
izingfuture.pdf. 
111.  Cornell & Kalt, supra note 14, at 16-17. 
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and asserting sovereign immunity might be a tool to reach those goals.  
Shifting from a narrow problem focus to a broader societal focus likely 
means considering all the consequences of asserting tribal sovereign 
immunity in a given context.  These consequences include ramifications to 
the nation’s institutions, especially its tribal court system, the legal 
consequences to the nation and other Native nations, the public relations 
consequences to the nation and other Native nations, and any additional 
consequences that may occur both locally and globally.112 
C. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WAIVERS CAN STRENGTHEN  
 TRIBAL COURTS 
At this point, it should be clear that a Native nation’s tribal sovereign 
immunity policy affects its tribal court system, but the question that remains 
is how can tribal sovereign immunity be used to strengthen tribal court 
systems.  The reality is that the consequences of a Native nation’s tribal 
sovereign immunity policy have the potential to be felt in all six of the 
components required for strong tribal courts.  Most significantly, any tribal 
sovereign immunity policy will directly affect the capacity, jurisdiction, and 
legitimacy of the tribal court associated with it, while having lesser impacts 
on the areas of accountability, funding, and independence. 
1. Accountability, Funding, and Independence 
The relationship between a Native nation’s tribal sovereign immunity 
policy and a tribal court’s accountability, funding, and independence is 
weak, but does exist.  With respect to accountability and independence, the 
relationship stems from the number of cases being heard by the court, 
which can be controlled—to a degree—by how a Native nation utilizes the 
sovereign immunity doctrine.  Specifically, a tribal court system seeking to 
demonstrate that it is accountable and independent will require cases 
moving through the system.113  After all, there can be no demonstrated 
accountability and no demonstrated independence if no disputes are being 
heard.  To this limited end, because a tribal sovereign immunity policy has 
 
112.  See Seiselstad, supra note 79, at 774 (“In light of the ever-present potential for change, 
it is imperative that tribes take advantage of this window of opportunity to reflect on what balance 
they wish to maintain between the need for immunity, on the one hand, and the need for 
government accountability and the ability of citizens and others who interact with tribes to seek 
enforcement of rights and redress for their injuries, on the other hand.  By doing so, tribes will 
strengthen the rules and institutions important to sustaining their powers of self-governance and 
prepare for future attacks aimed at the integrity and fairness of their justice systems.”). 
113.  See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts:  Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. 
L. REV. 225, 232-23 (1994). 
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an affect on the number of cases progressing through the court system, it, in 
turn, has a very limited affect on these two components. 
Although similarly weak in its connection, a tribal sovereign immunity 
policy may also affect a tribal court system’s funding.  As alluded to above, 
there is a large body of empirical evidence indicating that tribal court 
systems are key to Native nation economic development efforts.114  In order 
for tribal court systems to be useful in such efforts, they need to be seen as 
legitimate by potential investors and businesspersons.115  And, as will be 
discussed in more detail, a Native nation’s sovereign immunity  
policy—particularly with respect to contracts—greatly affects whether its 
justice system is viewed as being fair, which is at the heart of legitimacy.  
To the extent a nation’s tribal sovereign immunity policy affects investment 
within the nation, it also affects the money available to fund tribal court 
systems.  To put it more bluntly, a tribal sovereign immunity policy that 
creates an environment of fairness—particularly with respect to contract 
disputes—has the potential to help improve a Native nation’s economic 
situation, which could, in turn, result in additional funding available for the 
tribal court system.116 
2. Capacity 
A Native nation’s sovereign immunity policy can substantially affect 
its court system’s capacity with respect to the types of substantive issues it 
is capable of addressing.  Tribal court personnel develop legal expertise by 
a combination of formal education, various types of training and continuing 
education programs, and in courtroom experience.117  To a substantial 
degree, the types of cases that come before a tribal court system can be 
controlled by how a Native nation uses tribal sovereign immunity.  For 
example, a nation that allows no tort cases to proceed against the nation is 
likely to have a less sophisticated jurisprudence and understanding of tort 
issues.  At the other extreme, a nation that creates a special judicial body to 
handle only tort cases filed against the nation and then uses tribal sovereign 
immunity to waive those cases into this special body is more likely to have 
a very sophisticated understanding of torts and a developed jurisprudence in 
that substantive area.  Strategically using tribal sovereign immunity in this 
 
114.  Jorgenson & Taylor, supra note 15, at 5. 
115.  See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, supra note 113, at 233. 
116.  Jorgenson & Taylor, supra note 15, at 5. 
117.  See Hearing, supra note 36, at 29 (statement by William Thorne, Jr.). 
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manner can allow a tribal court system to hear more types of cases and 
improve its capacity.118 
Additionally, it is worth noting that the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity allows for even more subtle control over developing capacity in 
the manner just discussed.  Recall that tribal sovereign immunity allows 
Native nations not only to choose the forum and procedure used in a 
dispute, but it also allows a nation to determine its liability in such cases.  
Thus, a Native nation with a relatively young court system and relatively 
low capacity could strategically choose to waive sovereign immunity and 
allow a wide variety of cases to proceed to tribal court, but could also cap 
damages at a low level.  Over time, as the tribal court system develops more 
capacity, those liability limits could increase as trust in the tribal court’s 
expertise and jurisprudence increases.  In short, by utilizing different 
forums, procedures, and liability limits, Native nations have an array of 
options for developing the human capacity of their tribal court systems. 
3. Jurisdiction 
Tribal court jurisdiction grows and shrinks with every waiver and 
invocation of tribal sovereign immunity.  As discussed above, all courts 
require jurisdiction within which to operate, and there can be a difference 
between a court’s de jure jurisdiction and its de facto jurisdiction.  A Native 
nation’s sovereign immunity policy has a particularly strong effect on a 
court’s de facto jurisdiction.  Every time tribal sovereign immunity is used 
to prevent a case from being heard in a tribal court, that court is effectively 
losing jurisdiction, at least over that case.119  And when a Native nation has 
a policy whereby all cases in one substantive area are subject to tribal 
sovereign immunity, that nation’s tribal court has lost de facto jurisdiction 
over that substantive area of law—at least with respect to cases being filed 
against the nation itself.  On the other hand, when sovereign immunity is 
waived and a case is allowed to proceed in tribal court, that court is 
expanding its jurisdiction, at least with respect to that case.  And, similarly, 
if a Native nation alters its sovereign immunity policy to allow a tribal court 
to hear cases in a substantive area of law previously excluded by sovereign 
immunity, that trial court has substantially increased its de facto 
jurisdiction. 
 
118.  See id.  at 48 (statement of Sen. Daniel Inouye) (“If the capacity of the court is 
diminished by inadequate funding and support, it is the sovereignty of the tribe that is diminished. 
If the authority of the court is diminished by lack of regard from elevated tribal officials or the 
membership of the tribe, it is the standing of the tribe that suffers.”). 
119.  McCoy, supra note 83, at 42 (Procedurally speaking, sovereign immunity “deprives 
courts of subject matter jurisdiction,” making them unable to hear a particular case). 
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To a certain extent, not waiving tribal sovereign immunity and 
allowing cases to proceed in a tribal court may, over the long-term, have an 
even more detrimental effect to tribal court jurisdiction.  When a Native 
nation invokes sovereign immunity with respect to a specific case, it does 
not always follow that the case is never heard.  While it is sure to never be 
heard in a tribal court under such circumstances, plaintiffs regularly attempt 
to file their claims in state or federal court.  For the most part, these external 
court systems respect the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and dismiss 
the cases,120 but occasionally external courts accept the case and hear it on 
its merits.121  Sometimes, in the process of accepting such cases, state and 
federal courts have chipped away at the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity, or tribal jurisdiction, or both.122  Thus, every time a Native 
nation invokes tribal sovereign immunity—particularly in unique 
contexts—there is the risk of not only losing jurisdiction over the individual 
case involved, but also potentially losing more than that at the hands of 
state and federal judiciaries.  That does not necessarily mean a Native 
nation should never invoke tribal sovereign immunity.  Rather, Native 
nations must realize that any decision with respect to the doctrine needs to 
be strategic and needs to consider both the short-term and long-term effects 
on both the tribal court system and the nation as a whole. 
4. Legitimacy 
Finally, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity can be utilized 
strategically to improve both internal and external legitimacy.  A strong 
tribal court system thrives on legitimacy, and one crucial aspect of 
legitimacy is perceived fairness.123  Both Native citizens and non-Native 
 
120.  See, e.g., N. Arapaho Tribe v. Harnsberger, 697 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(“Thus, the district court correctly held that the Eastern Shoshone is a sovereign and not amenable 
to suit, and that no exception to sovereign immunity permis its joinder.  The Easter Shoshone 
could not, therefore, feasibly be joined.”); Gilbertson v. Quinault Indian Nation, 495 F.App’x 779 
(9th Cir 2012) (affirming the district court’s decision to dismiss the case based on tribal sovereign 
immunity); Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 692 F.3d 1200, 1212 
(11th Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court’s decision to dismiss the case based on lack of 
jurisdiction). 
121.  See, e.g., Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 955 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We . . . 
reverse the district court’s granting of the Viejas defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction due to tribal sovereign immunity, and remand for further proceedings.”); Agua 
Caliente Band of Cahullia Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004) (“The Tribe claims that, as a federally-recognized Indian tribe, it is immune from suit under 
the doctrine of tribal immunity . . .  We shall deny the Tribe’s petition.”). 
122.  See, e.g., Agua Caliente Band, 10 Cal Rptr.3d at 682 (denying the tribe’s assertion of 
tribal sovereign immunity through the creation of an exception to the tribal sovereign immunity 
doctrine based on the U.S. Constitution’s Article IV guarantee of a republican form of 
government). 
123.  Valencia-Weber, supra note 113, at 237-38. 
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individuals want a tribal court system that is fair.124  A fair system is 
substantially more likely to be treated as legitimate than an unfair one.  
And, ultimately, a Native nation’s sovereign immunity policy plays a large 
role in the perceived fairness of its courts. 
A fair court is one in which a wronged individual can be made whole 
again.  Because tribal sovereign immunity gives a Native nation the ability 
to decide which cases proceed against it and which do not, exercising 
sovereign immunity too frequently, or in the wrong types of cases, can very 
quickly make a court seem unfair and cost it legitimacy.  In a typical Native 
nation, citizens may wish to bring suits against the government for things 
like: civil rights violations, contract disputes, employment disputes (when 
the nation is the employer), and torts that occur on nation-owned lands.  
Similarly, a typical Native nation can expect non-Native individuals, 
corporations, and other governments to bring suits against the nation for: 
contract disputes, environmental law violations, torts that occur on nation-
owned lands, and tax disputes.  Regardless of an individual’s citizenship, 
the expectation is for an opportunity to be heard before a judicial forum, 
and a Native nation’s sovereign immunity policy is going to go a long way 
in deciding whether that expectation is met. 
A fair court is also one with procedures in place to dispense justice in a 
fashion that treats all individuals equally.  Native nations without a 
sovereign immunity policy are more likely to violate this aspect of fairness 
because policies, by design, exist to remove individuals getting special 
treatment.  Thus, a Native nation that invokes sovereign immunity in all 
contract disputes and a Native nation that waives sovereign immunity in all 
contract disputes both have procedures in place that treat all individuals 
equally.  Although the nation invoking sovereign immunity in all contract 
disputes may have to deal with the illegitimacy concerns just discussed, 
neither nation in this example can be accused of treating one individual 
differently from another.  But some Native nations lack sovereign immunity 
policies, and for these nations invoking and waiving sovereign immunity is 
done on a case-by-case basis.  The danger with such a policy is that it 
results in one contract case being heard in tribal court and another being 
turned away.  Over time, this type of differential treatment can take a toll on 
a tribal court’s legitimacy, the likes of which can be very difficult to recover 
from. 
 
124.  Tribal Court Systems and Indian Civil Rights Act:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 702-139 (1988) (statement of Sen. Daniel Evans) (“An essential 
litmus test for any judicial system is the faith and respect it earns from those over whom it 
presides.  For democracy cannot truly be served without a just and trusted judicial system.”). 
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Finally, a fair court must dispense justice consistently—meaning 
similar cases must be decided similarly.125  Fairness, in this sense, stems 
from a track record of respected decisions.  In order to achieve this track 
record, a tribal court system requires:  cases, time, and well-reasoned 
decisions.  While a Native nation’s sovereign immunity policy cannot 
guarantee the latter, it once again plays a significant role with respect to the 
first two requirements.  The more cases a tribal court system is able to hear 
in a given area of law, the more likely, over time, the court system will be 
able to develop the track record necessary to show that fairness.  Again, 
because tribal sovereign immunity acts as a gatekeeper over certain types of 
cases and whether they ever make it to court, how a nation uses the doctrine 
can have an immense impact on legitimacy. 
 
VI. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND TRIBAL COURTS:  
THREE CASE STUDIES 
Not only is it the case that a Native nation’s tribal sovereign immunity 
policy will affect tribal courts in a myriad of ways, but, if used strategically, 
the nation’s policy can strengthen tribal courts and, in turn, the entire 
nation.  In order to support this argument, I offer three case studies.  Each 
case study was chosen based on one criterion—the Native nation discussed 
in the study possesses a tribal court system widely regarded as among the 
strongest in Indian country.  Each study presents a brief overview of the 
Native nation’s court system, a brief explanation of its codified sovereign 
immunity policies, and a description of at least some of the strategic 
thinking the nation has gone through with respect to the doctrine as well as 
the fruits that strategy has produced.  While these case studies neither 
provide empirical data on the connection between tribal sovereign 
immunity and strong tribal court systems nor establish any causal 
connection between a specific tribal sovereign immunity policy and the 
strength of a specific tribal court, they are included because they reinforce 
many of the arguments put forth in this paper.  Additionally, these case 
studies introduce the reader to some innovative ways Native nations are 
approaching sovereign immunity today. 
A. MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS 
The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (“Choctaw Nation”) is a 
federally recognized tribe of approximately 8,300 members with 24,000 
 
125.  Valencia-Weber, supra note 113, at 237 (“The court, over time, should produce 
decisions that manifest a consistency with guiding principles that evoke respect and obedience.”). 
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acres of non-contiguous land scattered throughout the state of 
Mississippi.126  Little more than half a century ago, the Choctaw Nation 
possessed no industry, possessed no infrastructure necessary to attract 
economic development, had an unemployment rate over 75%, suffered from 
extensive and serious health issues,127 had exceptionally low graduation 
rates, and saw many of its people leave the reservation lands in order to find 
opportunities elsewhere.128  Today, however, the Choctaw Nation looks 
very different.  The Choctaw Nation is now the largest employer in 
Neshoba County and in the state of Mississippi.129  Unemployment has 
dropped substantially, and “dependen[ce] on transfer payments such as 
general welfare assistance from the federal government has dropped 
dramatically.”130  The Choctaw Nation now runs a myriad of businesses 
from construction services to a casino and golf course to an auto parts 
manufacturing facility to a printing plant.131  The Choctaw Nation provides 
many governmental services to its people, including law enforcement, 
courts, water, sewage, housing, and roads.132  In sum, the Mississippi 
Choctaw have made great strides towards their stated goal of self-
sufficiency over the past five decades.133 
 
126.  Sovereign Immunity Oversight Hearing to Provide for Indian Legal Reform:  Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. 350 (1998) (testimony of Chief Philip Martin, 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians) (hereinafter cited as “Testimony of Chief Phillip Martin”).  
This section draws heavily from the testimony of Chief Philip Martin, who was chief of the 
Choctaw nation from 1979-2007.  Chief Martin’s testimony took place before Congress on March 
11, 1998, and in order to maintain consistency, I have elected to rely on facts and figures about the 
Choctaw nation from that general time frame.  However, there is ample evidence that the 
successes of the Choctaw nation referenced in Chief Martin’s 1998 testimony continue to play out 
to this day.  See, e.g., Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Choctaw 
Tribal Court System , NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE (2006), 
http://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/2005_HN_Choctaw_tribal_court_sys
tem.pdf; Dennis Hevesi, Philip Martin, Who Led His Tribe to Wealth, Is Dead at 83, N.Y. TIMES, 
February 15, 2010, http://www nytimes.com/2010/02/15/us/15martin html?_r=0 (“Phillip Martin, 
a former chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, who guided his tribe from grinding 
poverty in the red clay hills of east central Mississippi to become proprietor of one of the state’s 
leading business empires . . . .”). 
127.  Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Choctaw Health Center, 
NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE 1, 1 (1999), http://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/ 
text/honoring_nations/1999_HN_Choctaw_health_center.pdf (“In the 1960s, members of the 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw subsisted in miserable economic and health conditions. Nearly all 
tribal housing was substandard (90 percent of tribal members lived in units with no plumbing and 
30 percent had no electricity), life expectancy was less than 50 years of age, and the Tribe’s infant 
mortality rate was among the highest in the United States.”). 
128.  See generally Testimony of Chief Philip Martin, supra note 126. 
129.  Id.  at 353. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. 
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1. Court System 
The Choctaw Nation’s award-winning tribal court system certainly 
played a role in the nation’s turnaround over the past few decades.134  The 
Choctaw Nation’s court system was established in 1974.  The court system 
was designed to be politically independent, with oversight equally divided 
between the executive and judicial branches.  It was also designed to attract 
qualified candidates via qualifications laid out in the Choctaw Tribal Code 
and ethical candidates via the Rules of Ethics and Conduct that bound all 
judicial employees.135  In 1997, the court system underwent a major reform 
process, the goal of which was “to become a full-service court system 
capable of handling a wide variety of cases effectively, to deepen the 
system’s grounding in Choctaw practices and law, and to grow the pool of 
prospective court personnel, so that the supply of Choctaw court services 
could keep pace with the rising demand.”136  The reform produced the 
current Choctaw Nation court system—a four-branch system with a civil 
division, criminal division, juvenile peacemaker division, and youth 
division.  The result of the Choctaw Nation’s efforts is a judicial system 
that “stands as a testament to the necessary power that consistent, 
competent, and culturally appropriate justice systems provide to support 
and promote a Native nation’s community and economy.”137 
2. Tribal Sovereign Immunity Policies 
The Choctaw Nation’s general provision on tribal sovereign immunity 
is found in their tribal code.  The provision defines when sovereign 
immunity has been waived and how it can be waived.  Specifically, the 
provision reads: 
Except as expressly abrogated by act of Congress, or as 
specifically waived by resolution or ordinance of the Tribal 
Council specifically referring to such, the Tribe shall be immune 
from suit in any civil action, and its officers and employees 
immune from suit for any liability arising from the performance of 
their official duties.138 
Additionally, the Choctaw Nation has other portions in their code that 
explicitly waive sovereign immunity, the most notable being the Choctaw 
Torts Claim Act, which reads in part:  “the immunity of the Tribe for 
 
134.  Choctaw Tribal Court System, supra note 126, at 1. 
135.  Id.  at 1-2. 
136.  Id.  at 2. 
137.  Id.  at 3. 
138.  C.T.C § 1-5-4 (2014). 
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monetary damages arising out of acts of the Tribe, or acts of employees of 
the Tribe, is hereby waived . . . provided, however, immunity of the Tribe 
in any such case shall be waived only to the extent of the maximum amount 
of liability provided for [by statute.]”139  Later in the Act, the sole forum for 
such claims is defined as the Choctaw Tribal Court.140 
3. Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Action 
The Choctaw Nation has utilized the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity to varying degrees over the years.  In 1998, then-Chief, Philip 
Martin told Congress: 
The success the Tribe has achieved would have never been 
possible without tribal sovereign immunity.  Tribal immunity from 
suit has played an essential role in the preservation of our 
autonomous political existence and has safeguarded our tribal 
assets.  It has also allowed us to develop institutions of  
self-government, realize self-sufficiency and participate in 
mainstream society.141 
But what did Chief Martin’s words mean—how was the Choctaw 
Nation able to use sovereign immunity strategically to reach its economic 
goals?  First, the Choctaw Nation realized that a long-term commercial 
relationship was “not [a question] of legal defenses or legal rights and legal 
immunities and jurisdiction,” but rather a question of trust.142  With this 
understanding, the Choctaw Nation treated sovereign immunity as a tool 
that could be used to garner or destroy outsider trust in the nation.  
According to Chief Martin, when the Choctaw Nation began pursuing 
economic development, they understood that “outsiders would not do 
business with tribes if it was not in their own economic self-interest to do 
so.”143  Thus, the ability to negotiate waivers of immunity with lenders, 
contractors, and other business entities was an essential tool in promoting 
trust and, ultimately, economic development.  Without such waivers, 
“[p]arties interested in conducting business with the Choctaws would not 
 
139.  C.T.C § 25-1-3(1) (2014). 
140.  C.T.C. § 25-1-7(1) (2014). 
141.  Testimony of Chief Philip Martin, supra note 126, at 353. 
142.  Id.  at 356. 
143.  Id.  at 355.  See also Tribal Sovereign Immunity:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. 694-137 (1996) (statement of Susan Williams) (“In the commercial 
context, tribes have a built-in incentive to waive their immunity from suit or otherwise protect 
non-Indians.  Interested parties will not be interested in conducting business on Indian 
reservations without an ability to seek redress for grievances.  Tribes, thus, will choose to waive 
immunity or take other similar steps to consummate a business deal.”). 
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have entered into . . . agreements had there been no legal ability to seek 
redress for grievances.”144 
Waiving sovereign immunity to help foster a business relationship was 
only the start from the Choctaw Nation’s perspective.  After waiving 
immunity, the next step was to perform on the promise—not only in the 
sense of adhering to the terms of the contract, but also maintaining the 
waiver of sovereign immunity in the case of a contractual breach.  The goal 
was to show that the trust put in the Choctaw Nation by outsiders was  
well-founded.  Trust was essential because it was only by building a  
long-term track record with lenders and business parties that ultimately 
allowed the Choctaw Nation to succeed.  Again, seeing sovereign immunity 
as a tool capable of cultivating or destroying trust is what guided the 
Choctaw Nation: 
Had we not lived up to our end of the deals and hid behind 
sovereign immunity had our partners come to seek redress, 
however, we would have destroyed our standing with the outside 
business community and could have never obtained the financing 
we needed to build and develop our commercial enterprises.145 
The Choctaw Nation understood that the free-market—in the  
long-term—would naturally favor those entities (whether business or 
governmental) capable of being trusted.  Waiving sovereign immunity can 
be, at least for some Native nations, an important tool in building that trust.  
Stated differently, for the Choctaw Nation, waiving sovereign immunity 
and adhering to their promises was not only “the right thing to do” but was 
also “in [the Choctaw Nation’s] best interests to do so.”146 
As the Choctaw Nation grew stronger economically, institutionally, 
and politically, the tribe changed how it used sovereign immunity as a tool.  
For instance, although the Choctaw Nation had few assets to worry about 
protecting when they first began their economic development process, such 
a position soon changed.  When it did, the Choctaw Nation’s method of 
waiving sovereign immunity strategically changed as well.  Instead of 
granting full waivers of immunity that potentially could place all tribal 
assets at risk with any contract—no matter how large or small the scope of 
the particular contract was—the Choctaw Nation began strategically 
limiting the immunity waiver to a specific dollar amount.  For example, if 
the Choctaw Nation’s investment in the project was set at two million 
 
144.  Testimony of Chief Philip Martin, supra note 126, at 355. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id.  at 354. 
         
2014] IN DEFENSE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 155 
dollars, then the waiver would be for that amount.147  This would allow 
recovery, in the case of a breach, of up to that amount in court.  With such 
waivers, the Choctaw Nation is “working toward a win-win” because “both 
sides have to have a good deal” in order for business to succeed.148  These 
types of waivers allow trust to be forged while simultaneously safeguarding 
tribal assets.149 
In the end, the Choctaw Nation used tribal sovereignty strategically 
over the course of decades to realize its own cultural, economic and 
political goals.  As the nation grew and changed, so did its use of tribal 
sovereign immunity.  From day one, however, the strategy was always 
long-term in its vision, and the nation continually sought to use tribal 
sovereign immunity waivers to build a track record of trust that would 
benefit the Choctaw Nation in the future. 
B. TULALIP TRIBE 
The Tulalip Tribes’ reservation is located in Washington state, about 
forty miles north of Seattle.  The Tulalip Reservation was reserved for the 
use and benefit of Indian tribes and bands signatory to the 1855 Treaty of 
Point Elliott.  It was established to provide a permanent home for the 
Snohomish, Snoqualmie, Skagit, Suiattle, Samish, and Stillaguamish Tribes 
and allied bands living in the region.150  Today, the Tulalip Tribes are 
comprised of more than 4,000 citizens and are continuing to grow in 
numbers.151 
 
147.  As Philip Martin described it,  
Just as important as our ability to assert immunity from suit has been our right to 
negotiate waivers of immunity with lenders, contractors and other non-Indian business 
entities.  Like all sovereigns—ranging raging from the United States of America to the 
City of Philadelphia, MS—we have had to necessarily waive our sovereign immunity 
to induce third parties to enter into contracts with us.  The Choctaws believe that this 
basic free enterprise or freedom of contract approach to addressing the tribal immunity 
issue is both the most economically efficient and the best way to protect our people.  A 
private party negotiating a contract with a sovereign tribe is in the best position to 
determine what terms of a deal are and are not acceptable, just as they are in 
negotiating a contract with anyone else . . . From our experience and standpoint, this 
contract approach is the most effective way for a tribe to negotiate with non-Indians 
and has worked very well for us. 
Testimony of Chief Philip Martin, supra note 126, at 303 
148.  Id.  at 36. 
149.  Id.  at 355. 
150.  Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Tulalip Alternative 
Sentencing Program, NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE 1, 1 (2006), 
http://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/2006_HN_Tulalip_alternative_senten
cing_program.pdf. 
151.  Tulalip Tribes, TULALIP TRIBES, http://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/. 
         
156 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:121 
1. Court System 
The Tulalip Tribes’ court system grew out of the award-winning 
Northwest Intertribal Court System (“NICS”).152  NICS is a consortium 
created in 1979 by thirteen western Washington tribes and was founded to 
assist Native nations in establishing tribal court systems.  NICS continues to 
provide a variety of services to Native nations, including court services to 
Native nations that are unable to run their own courts and technical 
assistance to Native nations developing or wishing to improve their own 
court systems.153  Currently, NICS “administers the judicial functions of the 
Tulalip Justice System including the two trial court judges and Appellate 
Court services.”154  The Tulalip Tribes’ court system is renown for a 
number of reasons that have been written about extensively elsewhere.  
First, the Tulalip Tribes were able to have criminal jurisdiction retroceded 
back to it in the year 2000, which allowed the nation to begin exercising 
control over crime in their territory that had run rampant.155  Second, the 
Tulalip Tribes were able to take that jurisdiction and exercise sovereignty 
over it with great skill, not only by drastically reducing criminal activity, 
but also by treating the causes of the criminal actions.156  Growing out of 
that work, the Tulalip Tribes have also been recognized for their alternative 
sentencing program, which has proven to be an integral cog in the wheel of 
their culturally legitimate and effective justice system.157 
2. Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Action 
The Tulalip Tribes’ policies with respect to sovereign immunity are 
extensive and are discussed infra as part of the study on how the nation 
 
152.  Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Northwest Intertribal 
Court System, NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE 1, 1 (2003), 
http://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/2003_HN_NW_Intertribal_Court_Sy
stem.pdf. 
153.  Id. 
154.  Leah Catherine Shearer, Justice in Indian Country:  A Case Study of the Tulalip Tribes 
(2011) (unpublished M.A. thesis, UCLA), http://turtletalk files.wordpress.com/2012/02/justice-in-
indian-country-a-casestudy-of-the-tulalip-tribes1.pdf. 
155.  65 Fed. Reg. 75,948 (Nov. 29, 2000). 
156.  Tribal Courts and the Administration of Justice in Indian County:  Hearing Before S. 
Comm. of Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 576-26 (2008) (statement of Theresa Pouley) (“In five 
years, the Tulalip Tribal Court has gone from what some characterized as a lawless reservation 
with rampant drug and alcohol deaths on our highways, to a very safe community.  They did that 
to ensure the economic development of the community, but they also did that by prioritizing the 
tribal justice system.”). 
157.  Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Tulalip Alternative 
Sentencing Program, NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE 1, 1 (2007), 
https://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/2006_HN_Tulalip_alternative_sente
ncing_program.pdf. 
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strategically uses the doctrine today.  As previously discussed, invoking 
sovereign immunity does not always keep a Native nation out of court.  
Sometimes even when a Native nation invokes sovereign immunity, the 
nation still ends up in state or federal court. And when they do, they are 
often accompanied by discussions of how the Native nation is being unfair 
or unjust.  Non-Native courts are frequently in agreement with the 
plaintiff’s sense of injustice and frequently the courts either find ways to 
imply a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity so that the case can go 
forward158 or, if nothing else, find time to explicitly mention the unjust use 
of sovereign immunity in the decision itself.159  In response to such 
challenges, the Tulalip Tribes have realized that, when a nation’s sovereign 
immunity policy is developed strategically and thoughtfully, it can address 
many of the concerns frequently raised in opposition to the doctrine.  
Specifically, well-crafted laws and codes about sovereign immunity can 
manage the expectations of all parties who interact with Native nations, 
create a system where justice is served for all, and provide absolute clarity 
to outside courts that may wish to waive (or uphold) tribal sovereign 
immunity against the nation’s wishes. 
While wrestling with the myriad of issues surrounding tribal sovereign 
immunity, the Tulalip Tribes came to the realization that both exercising 
and waiving sovereign immunity in different contexts can strengthen a 
nation’s sovereignty.  This philosophy is perhaps best expressed by Michael 
Taylor, an attorney for the Tulalip Tribes, who said: 
Sovereignty is a power.  Sovereign immunity is a part of that 
power.  And whether you’re waiving it, or asserting it, or writing it 
into an ordinance or a contract or whatever it is, you are exercising 
it.  And . . . waiver strengthens it.  It strengthens it by actually 
showing that you have it and [are] putting it out there in whatever 
form.160 
The idea conveyed by Taylor is simple in principle:  if sovereign 
immunity is always waived or never waived, then the power loses much of 
its meaning and usefulness.  It is only through the decision to exercise 
sovereign immunity in some instances and the decision to waive sovereign 
immunity in other situations that the power, as an aspect of sovereignty, 
 
158.  See, e.g., C & L Enter., Inc., v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe, 532 U.S. 411 
(2001). 
159.  See, e.g., Filer v. Tohono O’odham Nation Gaming Enter., 129 P.3d 78, 84-85 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
160.  Michael Taylor, Nation-Owned Enterprises:  Quil Ceda Village, NATIVE NATIONS 
INSTITUTE, https://nnidatabase.org/db/video/michael-taylor-nation-owned-businesses-quil-ceda-
village. 
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really carries any value and can be used to achieve different strategic ends.  
With this understanding in mind, the Tulalip Tribal Codes (“TTC” or 
“Code”) have been carefully developed to achieve the nation’s own specific 
goals. 
Even a cursory glance at the TTC provides insight into the Tulalip 
Tribes’ strategy with respect to sovereign immunity.  The 2012 version of 
the Code is more than 1,000 pages in length and is divided into fifteen 
separate titles.161  All fifteen titles contain at least one reference to tribal 
sovereign immunity,162 and, in total, more than fifty different sections 
throughout the Code reference the doctrine.  The mere fact that a large 
amount of space is dedicated to tribal sovereign immunity demonstrates the 
importance of the doctrine to the Tulalip Tribes, an assumption supported 
by the text itself in TCC section 2.35.010(2), which asserts that “[t]ribal 
sovereign immunity serves an important function in preserving limited 
Tribal resources so that the Tribes can continue to provide governmental 
services which promote health, safety, welfare and economic security for 
the residents of and visitors to the lands of the Tribes.” 
A more careful examination of the Code provides additional insight 
into the Tulalip Tribes’ strategies and policies surrounding tribal sovereign 
immunity.  In some instances, the Tulalip nation is making it clear that their 
decision to act in a specific field of law does not equate to a waiver of 
sovereign immunity.  For example, provisions such as TCC sections 
4.10.380 and 7.15.050, which deal with sex offender registry and 
environmental infractions, respectively, have blanket language that clearly 
preserves sovereign immunity for the nation:  “The sovereign immunity of 
the Tulalip Tribes shall in no matter be waived by this chapter.”163  These 
types of provisions give tribal members, outsiders, and courts notice that the 
Tulalip nation’s sovereign immunity remains intact for suits in these areas. 
In contrast, other provisions of the TCC very clearly, and carefully, 
waive sovereign immunity under certain circumstances.  For instance, in the 
field of tort liability—an area where many non-Native courts and press like 
to attack sovereign immunity—the Tulalip Tribes first recognized its need 
to balance the provision of “governmental services which promote health, 
safety and economic security” with also providing “a remedy to private 
persons who are injured by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of the 
 
161.  Tulalip Tribal Codes:  A Codification of the General Ordinances of the Tulalip Tribes, 
CODE PUBLISHING COMPANY (2012), http://www.codepublishing.com/wa/Tulalip/?f (hereinafter 
referred to as “TCC”). 
162.  See, e.g., TCC §§ 1.25.030; 2.10.180; 3.22.490; 4.25.070; 5.25.050; 6.10.070; 
7.15.050; 8.20.040; 9.05.590; 10.35.150; 11.05.170; 12.20.130; 13.05.060; 14.15.130; 15.20.070. 
163.  TCC § 8.20.040. 
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Tribes or its agents, employees or officers.”164  In order to achieve this 
balance, the nation established a “limited waiver of Tribal sovereign 
immunity”165 that allowed “action[s] for monetary damages” to be brought 
in Tribal Court subject to a number of limitations,166 most notably that “[n]o 
monetary damages shall be awarded . . .  in excess of the limits of insurance 
maintained by the Tribes to compensate for [the] injury claimed.”167 
The decision to waive sovereign immunity was not an accidental one, 
but one that the Tulalip Tribes saw as in their own best interest.  As 
Michael Taylor explained: 
[I]f you followed the process, and if you’ve been injured by the 
tribe, you’re going to be paid something to make you whole.  And 
as a hospitality entity we’ve got to do that.  If people fall off the 
curb at the casino parking lot, and it’s our fault, and they injure 
themselves, it’s quickly going to be known around the region that 
you shouldn’t go to the Tulalip casino because if you fall off the 
curb and hurt yourself, the tribe is going to raise sovereign 
immunity and you can’t collect anything.  So people aren’t going 
to come.168 
Additionally, even though the Tulalip Tribes decided to waive 
sovereign immunity, they realized that they had a choice about what forum 
the case would be heard in after immunity had been waived.  With respect 
to tort claims, the Tulalip Tribes strategically chose to only waive immunity 
into its own tribal courts, and, again, it was not an accidental decision.  “We 
put a lot of work into [the] tribal court,” continues Taylor.  “[The Harvard 
Project on American Indian Economic Development] gave us an award 
recently.  Our tribal court is good.  We’ve got good judges, we’ve got good 
court of appeals, and we’ve got good ordinances.”169  The Tribes’ decision 
to use its own courts not only provides a remedy for those who are injured, 
but also strengthens the legitimacy of their own courts in the process. 
Outside the context of torts, the Tulalip Tribes also created other areas 
where specific waivers of sovereign immunity have been granted by the 
Code.170  Many of these waivers relate to nation-owned businesses or 
governmental corporations.  In the TCC, title 15 covers governmental 
entities such as governmental corporations.  Within title 15, there are 
 
164.  TCC § 2.35.010(3). 
165.  Id. 
166.  See TCC § 2.35.050. 
167.  TCC § 2.35.030. 
168.  Taylor, supra note 160. 
169.  Id. 
170.  See, e.g., TCC 9.10.060; 15.05.110. 
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provisions related to, for example, the Tulalip Construction Company and 
the Tulalip Telecommunications Company, both of which are wholly 
owned by the Tulalip Tribes.171  And both companies have carefully crafted 
waivers of immunity: 
The Tulalip Construction Company is a legal creation of the 
Tulalip Tribes and is subject to the jurisdiction, laws, and 
ordinances of the Tribes.  This chapter shall be deemed to be a 
waiver by the Tribes of sovereign immunity from suit only with 
respect to the telecommunication company and its separate assets, 
and may only be enforced in accordance with the charter of the 
Tribes’ Federal corporation.  Nothing in this chapter shall be 
deemed or construed to be a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
suit on the part of the Tulalip Tribes, or to allow any action against 
any of its assets, or to be a consent of the Tribes to the jurisdiction 
of any state with regard to the business or affairs of the Tribes, or 
to any cause of action, case of controversy, or other claim, except 
as unequivocally and expressly set forth herein.172 
These waivers purposefully allow the corporations to answer for any 
wrongs they commit or debts they owe without putting the nation’s treasury 
at risk. 
Other provisions of the TCC handle sovereign immunity in a different 
way still.  In some instances, the Code states that there is no automatic 
waiver within a given context, but then goes on to state that the power to 
waive has been delegated to a specific entity and, furthermore, lays out the 
procedure the entity must follow to legally effect a waiver of sovereign 
immunity.  For instance, chapter 6.05 vests the Tulalip Tribal Housing 
Department with the ability to “waive any immunity from suit” so long as 
the contract has first been approved by Board of Directors of the Tulalip 
Tribes.173  Similarly, chapter 15.20 permits sovereign immunity to be 
waived with respect to the Tulalip Forestry Enterprise, an “enterprise of the 
Tulalip Indian Tribes,”174 but only if an “express and unequivocal 
resolution of the Tulalip Board” exists, and even then, the waiver is “only to 
the extent specified in such resolution.”175  The strategic decision to spell 
out in detail how immunity may be waived in such situations ensures that 
all parties interacting with the nation—including non-Native courts—are 
 
171.  TCC §§ 15.15.050; 15.25.050. 
172.  TCC § 15.15.050. 
173.  TCC § 6.05.050(5)(c). 
174.  TCC § 15.20.70. 
175.  TCC § 15.20.080(12). 
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aware of what does and does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity 
in different contexts. 
The Tulalip Tribes’ decision to create places in their Code where 
sovereign immunity is not automatically waived, but which may be waived, 
gives the nation maximum flexibility to deal with different situations that 
arise.  Generally speaking, the Tulalip Tribes waive sovereign immunity 
when asked to do so, but the Code’s malleability allows for case-by-case 
determinations.176  Thus, in the rare circumstances in which the Tulalip 
nation is asked to waive sovereign immunity, but doing so is seen as an 
affront to the nation’s sovereignty, the nation will not waive their right.  
According to Taylor: 
When do you not waive your immunity?  When . . . you see it as 
an attack on your tribal sovereignty[.]  We’re building a hotel now.  
[The construction company] wanted a waiver of immunity.  And 
we said, “Fine.”  And we worked, and worked, and worked on this 
waiver of immunity, and . . . in the middle they said, “We want 
state court.”  We did an arbitration provision, which allowed 
disputes to be arbitrated by an appropriate arbitrator.  But 
arbitration awards have to be enforced by a court.  There has to be 
a court out there that will enforce the ruling of the arbitrator.  The 
arbitrator doesn’t have judicial authority.  The arbitrator can, under 
the contract, act like a judge, make an award to one side or the 
other, but if one side or the other won’t follow the direction of the 
arbitrator, the ruling of the arbitrator, you have to have a court at 
the end.  [The company] said to us, “We won’t accept your tribal 
court.  You have to waive immunity in state court.”  So, we got 
another contractor.  We just finally said, “We’re not doing it.” . . . 
Our tribal court is good.177 
Finally, the Tulalip Tribes’ sovereign immunity provisions achieve one 
more end.  Not only do they state when sovereign immunity has been 
waived, when it has not, and how it might be waived in certain future 
instances, but the TCC also has multiple provisions clarifying which 
individuals and entities are covered by sovereign immunity and which are 
not.  Littered throughout the Code are provisions that expressly extend 
sovereign immunity to protect, for example, the Enrollment Committee and 
others associated with making enrollment decisions,178 the Tribal Gaming 
 
176.  Taylor, supra note 160. 
177.  Id. 
178.  TCC § 5.05.160. 
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Commission,179 the Executive Director and Tribal staff when they are 
acting pursuant to Title 11 of the TCC, which relates to garbage disposal 
and sanitary land fill issues,180 and the port of Tulalip, which houses the 
nation’s marina operations.181 
It is clear that the TCC has been carefully developed to ensure that the 
world is aware of when tribal sovereign immunity has and has not been 
waived, who is covered by tribal sovereign immunity within the Tulalip 
nation, and who has the power to waive tribal immunity as well as the 
process required for a waiver to be effective.  The Tribes’ decision to spell 
out the answers to these points in their code and to make their code 
available publicly online,182 gives everyone interacting with the opportunity 
to understand what rights and privileges do and do not exist when dealing 
with the nation.  When the rules are clearly spelled out and accessible, then 
those interacting with the nation are on notice about the state of the law.  
And when people are on notice of the law, concerns about due process 
violations, equal protection violations, and injustice begin to lessen because 
expectations are being managed.  This management of expectations is, 
ultimately, one of the strongest assets the comprehensive handling of 
sovereign immunity in the TCC has to offer. 
C. GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS 
The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (“GTB”) is 
a federally recognized tribe located in northern Michigan.  GTB has 
approximately 4,100 citizens, about 17% of which live on reservation 
land.183  GTB was the first tribe recognized by the federal government in 
Michigan and opened one of the first casinos on tribal land.184 
1. Court System 
Among GTB’s many accomplishments is an award-winning court 
system.  GTB’s court opened in 1988, but only served the community on a 
part-time basis.  Little by little, GTB invested in their court system, and 
today it includes both a trial court comprised of two justices and an 
 
179.  TCC § 10.05.060(2). 
180.  TCC § 11.05.170. 
181.  TCC § 15.30.010(2). 
182.  Tulalip Tribal Codes, supra note 161. 
183.  Kristine L. Petoskey, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Waste 
Management Plan, GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF INDIANS 1 (2010), 
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184.  Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYO. L. 
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appellate court comprised of three justices.185  GTB also has invested 
resources into developing more culturally appropriate dispute resolution 
mechanisms to be used in specific types of cases.  Ultimately, the tribal 
court system at GTB became its own branch of government, giving it the 
independence necessary to carry out its purpose.186 
2. Tribal Sovereign Immunity Policies 
GTB, unlike the other two cases examined, addresses the issue of 
sovereign immunity in their constitution.  Article XIII of the GTB 
Constitution is entitled “Sovereign Immunity,” and Section One of that 
Article states that GTB is immune from suit “except as authorized by this 
Article or in furtherance of tribal business enterprises upon a resolution 
approved by an affirmative vote of five (5) of the seven (7) members of the 
Tribal Council.”  Among the authorized waivers of sovereign immunity 
found in the GTB Constitution is a provision that allows suits against 
government officials “in the tribal court system by tribal members for the 
purpose of enforcing rights and duties established by this Constitution and 
by the ordinances and resolutions of the Tribe.”187  In addition to these 
constitutional statements, GTB’s legal code, much like the TCC, repeatedly 
references sovereign immunity and whether it is reserved or waived in 
various circumstances. 
3. Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Action 
GTB, along with the majority of the Native nations in Michigan, have 
come to realize that tribal sovereign immunity, particularly in the taxation 
context, does not have to be a wedge that drives the state and Native nations 
further apart, as is so often the case.  Instead, it can actually be a tool to 
bring the two parties together at the bargaining table to hash out agreements 
on a wide range of issues, including taxation and other types of regulation.  
In fact, Native nations across the country have entered into hundreds of 
agreements with states on taxation matters over the years.188  These 
 
185.  Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Tribal Court of the 
Grand Traverse Band, NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE 1, 1 (2000), 
https://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/1999_HN_Grand_Traverse_Band_tr
ibal_court.pdf. 
186.  Id. 
187.  CONSTITUTION OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS 
(1988) art. XIII, sec. 1, http://narf.org/nill/Codes/gtcode/constitution.pdf. 
188.  State and Federal Tax Policy:  Building New Markets in Indian Country:  Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 619-30 (2011) (statement of Steven J. Gunn); 
Sovereign Immunity:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. 303-374 
(1998) (statement of Pres. Ron Allen, National Congress of American Indians) (“[M]ore than 200 
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agreements would likely not be possible if the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity did not exist.  But what makes the agreements made between 
Michigan and several Michigan Native nations, including GTB, truly 
unique is that through the strategic use of sovereign immunity, GTB and the 
other nations were able to substantially increase their tribal court 
jurisdiction.  This increased jurisdiction allows the GTB tribal court to hear 
any case where Michigan is a party and the dispute is related to the tax 
agreement. 
Generally speaking, current law allows states to impose taxes on  
non-Indians who make purchases of certain commodities—such as gasoline 
and tobacco—when those purchases occur on Native nation lands.189  
Although there are restrictions, the state may legally require Native nations 
to collect those taxes on behalf of the state.  While states may legally 
require Native nations to collect the tax, states are unable to sue Native 
nations in an attempt to recover that tax due to the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity.190  This, understandably, has caused much friction 
between states and Native nations.  However, the fact that states cannot sue 
for recovery also gives states an incentive to sit down and talk to Native 
nations. 
At first glance, it may be unclear why Native nations would want to sit 
down and talk to states about taxation when they could merely collect taxes 
on the reservation and use sovereign immunity to keep the money.  
Although some Native nations may gladly talk out of a spirit of cooperation 
or to keep positive state-tribal relationships, others would presumably see 
no apparent benefit in bargaining with the state.  The reality of the situation, 
however, is that if Native nations are unwilling to consult with states, then 
two possible outcomes become likely.  First, if Native nations are unwilling 
to negotiate with states, then states have shown they will take it upon 
themselves to try to find new ways to indirectly collect the tax revenue from 
Native nations or from nonmembers making purchases from Native nations, 
which “creates the potential for double of triple taxation” and “imposes 
hardships on nonmembers and tribes.”191  Second, due to the “uncertainty in 
existing federal law over the precise extent of state and local taxing 
authority over nonmembers in Indian country,” lawsuits become 
 
tribes in 18 states have created successful state-tribal compacts” as of 1998); Fletcher, supra note 
49. 
189.  Hearing, supra note 188, at 31 (statement by Steven J. Gunn) (“[T]he courts have 
upheld state taxes on cigarette sales to nonmembers, state severance taxes on oil and gas produced 
by nonmembers in Indian country.”). 
190.  See generally Kiowa Tribe. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
191.  Hearing, supra note 188, at 35 (statement by Steven J. Gunn). 
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common.192  Either a Native nation is challenging a state taxation scheme or 
a state is challenging a Native nation’s refusal to turn over revenue.  In 
either scenario, it can take years of litigation and large amounts of time and 
money by Native nations (and by states) to adjudicate the claims.  On top of 
these considerations, given that the law is uncertain, there is no way to 
know which side will ultimately win.  For some Native nations, the time 
and money associated with adjudication may be neither practical nor 
desirable.  On the other hand, when a Native nation chooses to enter into a 
tax agreement with a state, it provides that nation with certainty and “allows 
the [nation] to plan for the future in terms of business plans, project 
financing, and the provision of government services to tribal members.”193 
The reality is that so long as both Native nations and states are thinking 
in the long-term, tribal sovereign immunity in the taxation context can 
actually bring Native nations and states together.  This is precisely what has 
happened in the state of Michigan over the past decade.  Michigan is home 
to twelve federally recognized tribes.194  Currently, ten of those twelve 
tribes have at least one tax agreement with the state of Michigan.195  As is 
often the case, Michigan’s “stated motivation to negotiate with the 
Michigan Tribes stemmed mostly from its inability to collect valid taxes 
from non-tribal members in Indian Country.”196  On the other side, the 
Native nations “were motivated to meet with the State because the State 
began to charge sales and use tax on construction contractors doing 
business on reservation and trust land.”197  These taxes were, naturally, 
being passed on to the Native nations of Michigan.198  In short, prior to 
negotiations, Michigan believed that it was losing tax revenue to Native 
nation businesses who were “exploiting tax exemptions to garner a 
competitive advantage.”199  To the contrary, the Native nations believed 
that the state’s tax scheme on construction contractors was “illegal” and 
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resulted in the state having collected “hundreds of thousands of dollars” 
from the construction of Native governmental buildings on trust lands.200 
Despite these conflicting views, many Native nations from Michigan 
came to the bargaining table with hopes of reaching an agreement that could 
not only benefit their own Native community, but  that could also improve 
their relationship with the state and provide stability in the realm of taxation 
going forward.201  In all ten agreements, the Native nations involved are 
recognized as “sovereign governments”202 with “sovereign rights,” and the 
agreements themselves were produced “on a government to government 
basis,” “in good faith,” “in a spirit of cooperation,” and with hopes of 
finding a “fair and workable understanding regarding the application and 
administration of” state tax issues.203  During the negotiations, exemptions 
from six state taxes were ultimately discussed:  sales and use taxes, motor 
fuel taxes, tobacco taxes, income taxes, and the Michigan Single Business 
Tax.204  There were also discussions about a sales tax revenue sharing 
scheme for those Native nations that had already adopted their own sales 
tax codes.205  Due to a number of unique legal issues arising in Michigan, 
the negotiations were extremely complex. 
Ultimately, however, agreements were reached between Michigan and 
ten Native nations.  Each of the agreements between Michigan and the 
Native nations have slight variations, but all share some of the same 
overarching structure.  For instance, while all of the agreements exempt 
tribal members from having to pay certain state sales and use taxes, the 
methods for administering these exemptions vary.  Some agreements 
employ a “refund method” that “simply allows the Tribes to seek 
reimbursement for sales and use taxes collected by vendors from the 
State.”206  Other nations, who were leery of trying to get money back from 
the state, utilized “certificates of exemption,” which, when presented to 
state vendors along with an authorization letter from the state, allowed 
purchasers to avoid having to pay the sales and use taxes at the time of 
purchase.207 
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In addition to exemptions for tribal members, the Native nations of 
Michigan negotiated the possibility of a sales tax revenue sharing scheme.  
Normally, under Michigan law, Native nations who have no tribal sales tax 
are required to collect the state sales tax and remit all of the money 
collected to the state.208  Along with the money, Native nations are required 
to send documentation indicating which sales were from tribal members so 
the state could refund that portion of the tax back to the nation.209  Under 
the agreements, however, Native nations who had implemented their own 
sales tax provisions were able to enter into a new type of revenue sharing 
with the state.  The sharing scheme allowed Native nations to keep two-
thirds of the taxes collected on the first five million dollars in sales on their 
lands and half of all taxes collected thereafter.210  The goal of this option for 
Native nations was to “preserve revenues for each side as much as 
possible.”211 
With respect to the more contentious issues of motor fuel and tobacco 
taxation, agreements were also reached.  In both instances, Native nations 
essentially agreed to determine a cap on the amount of tax-free sales of 
these goods that would occur on their lands.212  The specifics of how a 
nation administers its tax exemption can vary, however.  Some Native 
nations employ a “refund method” by which they provide records to the 
state on sales made and the state refunds the nation its part of the tax.  
Alternatively, other nations administer the exemption by a “quota method” 
where “each individual Tribe and the State negotiate for a cap or quota on 
the amount of tobacco products or motor fuels the Tribe may purchase tax-
free for a period of time.”213  The refund method ensures that only Native 
citizens recieve the tax break, whereas the quota method allows the 
individual Native nations to decide “through its allocation of [the] quota 
how to distribute the benefit.”214 
Although the agreements negotiated touched on a myriad of issues, the 
final one worth mentioning here relates to enforcement of the terms of the 
agreement.  It was in this context that tribal sovereign immunity once again 
played a strategic role.  Both Michigan and the Native nations knew that the 
agreement was meaningless if it could not be enforced, and it could not be 
 
208.  Id.  at 30. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id.  at 34. 
213.  Id.  at 33-34. 
214.  Id.  at 34. 
         
168 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:121 
enforced unless Native nations agreed to waive their sovereign immunity.215  
Thus, Native nations were able to strategically use sovereign immunity in 
the negotiation process.  In the end, tribal sovereign immunity was waived, 
but only after terms of the waiver were carefully worked out and agreed 
upon.216 
The first condition of waiving tribal sovereign immunity was to only 
allow initial claims in tribal courts.  Under the terms of the agreements, 
arbitration was to take place in the event of any dispute.217  However, if 
arbitration did not occur, then the Native nations agreed to waive their 
immunity so that Michigan could file a case in tribal court to compel 
arbitration and to enforce any arbitration award.218  In the event that a tribal 
court did not act on the state’s claim within fourteen days, the state was 
then able to seek redress in the courts of Michigan.219  This waiver of 
sovereign immunity was to survive even if a Native nation sought to 
terminate the agreement.220  Otherwise, as the state argued, a Native nation 
could simply terminate the agreement at any time and then use sovereign 
immunity to prevent any recourse.221 
Additionally, while the Native nations that signed agreements with 
Michigan waived their sovereign immunity with respect to the dispute 
resolution provisions, the nations were very careful to protect themselves 
from other types of legal issues that may arise in the future.  Most notably, 
the agreements entered into included the following provisions: 
First, tribal officials may not be criminally prosecuted for 
violations of state law or the Agreement.  Second, the State may 
conduct an audit of the Tribe in regards to any of the six taxes at 
issue, but must provide thirty days written notice.  Third, the State 
may not seize tribal assets in order to enforce a tax liability under 
the Agreement.  Fourth, the State may conduct unauthorized 
inspections of tribal facilities for the purpose of discovering only 
contraband, motor fuel or tobacco products, and may only seize 
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those items that can be viewed in plain sight.  Finally, the State 
must go to tribal court for a search warrant to search and seize 
items in tribal facilities . . . .  The parties [also] agreed to allow the 
State to enter Indian Country and enforce state law against non-
members provided [first] that the State give notice of the 
enforcement action to tribal law enforcement.222 
In sum, while there were additional issues discussed and agreed upon 
between Michigan and the Native nations who live there, the above 
examples provide a brief overview of how negotiations can often lead to 
better solutions for both Native nations and states than would otherwise be 
possible in the litigation context.  As is the case with any negotiation, 
neither side was able to walk away with everything that they wanted, but 
Native nations were able to prioritize the matters most important to them 
and achieve some significant gains in those areas.  These gains, and indeed 
the negotiation itself, would likely have been more difficult, if not 
impossible, had Native nations not thought strategically about sovereign 
immunity and how it could be a tool in the nations’ long-term goals. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this article I have put forth arguments in favor of tribal sovereign 
immunity by demonstrating that it is a tool capable of helping create strong 
tribal court systems.  Specifically, tribal sovereign immunity has a robust 
ability to improve tribal court systems’ capacity and legitimacy, while also 
expanding tribal court jurisdiction.  Tribal sovereign immunity has a 
limited, but meaningful role in improving tribal court systems with respect 
to accountability, funding, and independence.  Native nations serious about 
exercising self-determination must think strategically about sovereign 
immunity.  The three case studies discussed here help provide a more robust 
picture of how Native nations with strong court systems are approaching the 
issue.  While additional research should be done to verify the various 
connections between tribal sovereign immunity policies and strong tribal 
court systems, the time has come when no Native nation serious about self-
determination can ignore the ramifications of how its own policy with 
respect to tribal sovereign immunity is affecting the nation’s future. 
Additionally, no Native nation serious about self-determination can ignore 
the reality that the strategic management of the tribal sovereign immunity 
doctrine can be an effective tool to bring about positive change for any 
Native nation. 
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